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2.5  years  into  the 
crisis, and there may 
still  lie  unpleasant 
surprises  ahead  of 
us.  Think  of  some 
German state banks 
(Landesbanken), or 
some private banks 
facing  a  surge  in 
borrower  delinquencies,  or  think  of 
the  overleveraging  of  some  European 
states, like Greece or Spain. Late as it 
may  seem,  we  now  also  see  the  first 
decisive  counter-moves  of  parliaments 
and  governments.  The  long-awaited 
regulatory  wave,  likened  by  some  to 
Godot,  the  protagonist  in  Beckett’s 
famous play, is eventually arriving. This 
in itself is good news. But as usual, the 
devil  is  in  the  details.  The  strengths 
and  weaknesses  of  each  regulatory 
innovation  have  to  be  scrutinized, 
before an assessment can be made – and 
even then it remains preliminary, as we 
have to see how market participants will 
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adjust their behaviour in light of the new 
rules. 
For a beginning, take the recent direc-
tive  on  rating  agencies,  issued  by  the 
European  Parliament  and  the  Council 
on 16 September 2009. This new piece 
of regulation deserves credit for a list 
of useful rules that rating agencies have 
to respect if they are active in Europe.   
Several rules address relevant incentive 
problems,  for  example  the  regulation 
prescribes  the  separation  of  advisory 
services from rating services, it requires 
unsolicited  ratings  to  be  explicitly 
marked,  and  it  limits  the  possibility 
for  rating  shopping.  Some  other  rules 
try to micromanage internal corporate 
governance  rules  by,  for  example, 
setting  guidelines  for  compensation 
and  job  rotation  in  rating  agencies;  it 
is  doubtful  whether  they  will  achieve 
anything meaningful, but I do not see 
that they cause significant harm either.
More importantly, and still on the plus 
side, the regulation requires agencies to 
deposit  statistics  on  rating  assignment 
default  experiences  in  a  central 
depository  to  be  maintained  by  the 
new regulator, the European Securities 
Markets  Authority  (ESMA)  in  Paris. 
This is clearly an important step forward, 
giving  the  European  agency  access  to 
first-hand data. However, to be able to 
properly compute rating performance it 
is essential that the agency gets access 
to the raw data, i.e. the ratings assigned 
and the defaults experienced. Only such 
an enhanced data sharing will allow the 
agency as well as investors around the 
world to distinguish high quality ratings 
(and rating agencies) from poor ones. 
At the other end of the spectrum we 
also  find  significant  shortcomings  in 
the  new  regulation.  The  first  relates 
to  the  key  element  of  the  directive, 
the disclosure of rating methodologies 
by  agencies.  The  second  shortcoming 
concerns the insufficient empowerment 
of  a  common  European  regulator  to 
oversee the regulation. Let us look at 
both issues in turn.
First, the disclosure of rating methodo-
logies, reasonable as it may sound at first 
glance, is dangerous. Most importantly, 
these rules invite companies and banks 
to  come  up  with  financial  products 
and  portfolios  that  escape  the  risk 
measurement rod of the agency model.   
It does so also because, due to disclosure 
and  contestability  of  ratings,  agencies 
will limit the amount of soft information 
recognized in the rating process. This is 
disadvantageous  over  the  long  term, 
because then the information value of 
ratings will be reduced.
The  second  built-in  weakness  is  the 
strong  role  played  (still  played)  by 
the national treasury and the national 
supervisory  authorities.  CESR,  the 
forerunner of ESMA, is responsible for 
setting  up  and  coordinating  colleges 
of supervisors. It is not empowered to 
consolidate the supervisory process and 
has  only  limited  disciplinary  powers. 
The lack of enforcement powers on the 
European level opens the door widely 
for  regulatory  capture  by  financial 
institutions at the national level. 
Thus,  in  conclusion,  this  major  piece 
of  new  European  regulation  needs 
legal  adjustment  (or  ‘tuning’)  on 
issues  relating  to  transparency  (more 
information is not always desired) and 
to enforcement (proximity of regulator 
and agency on the national level is not 
always desired). Sometimes, less can be 
more:  less  methodological  disclosure 
and less decision power retained on the 
national level.
We wish Karl Otto Pöhl all the very best 
on the occasion of his 80th birthday!
From 1980 to 1991, Karl Otto Pöhl was President of the Deutsche Bundesbank. During 
that period, he played a decisive role in stabilizing the D-Mark and bringing inflation under 
control. He may also be considered one of the founding fathers of the euro since he was 
involved early on in the preparatory negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty.
From 1996 till 2006, Karl Otto Pöhl was President of CFS and Chairman of the Board of 
Trustees of the CFS sponsoring body (Gesellschaft für Kapitalmarktforschung e.V.).
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Policy Platform
The  first  steps  towards  a  House  of 
Finance Policy Platform have now been 
accomplished. The idea is to have a single 
website that gives access to policy articles 
and related working papers written by 
House of Finance researchers and faculty 
members  of  the  Faculty  of  Economics 
and  Business  Administration  and  the 
Faculty of Law of Goethe University.
The  Platform  is  a  joint  project  of  the 
Center for Financial Studies (CFS), the 
Institute  for  Law  and  Finance  (ILF), 
and  the  Institute  for  Monetary  and 
Financial Stablity (IMFS). The founders 
of  the  initiative  are  Theodor  Baums, 
Stefan  Gerlach,  Roman  Inderst,  and 
Jan Pieter Krahnen. This new project is 
an exciting start of a new cooperation 
not  only  between  the  three  institutes, 
but also between faculty from different 
disciplines,  namely  macroeconomics, 
law, and finance. It is unique within the 
House  of  Finance  and  may  be  seen  as 
a  role  model  for  future  synergies  and 
interdisciplinary scientific cooperation.
The main task of the Policy Platform is 
to pool policy relevant publications that 
are to this day widely dispersed and not 
easily or not at all accessible. The new 
Policy Platform gives access to these con-
tributions in a well-structured manner.
The  site  will  also  become  the  gate  to 
policy  relevant  research  undertaken  in 
the  House  of  Finance.  The  objective 
is  to  inform  policy  makers,  market 
participants but also the general public in 
a non-technical way about current issues 
related  to  financial  markets  and  their 
regulation,  monetary  economics  and 
central banking, as well as financial law 
and public finance. The Policy Platform 
will  also  adopt  a  pro-active  approach 
with  respect  to  ongoing  policy  issues 
like, for instance, the reform of financial 
regulation.
Contributions  are  published  either 
as  Policy  Letters  or  as White  Papers, 
both are available online. White Papers 
comprise more comprehensive research-
based  contributions  to  current  policy 
debates. Policy Letters are short essays 
or  commentaries  on  current  policy 
topics,  usually  written  for  publication 
in the press. 
The Platform also aims to provide a forum 
for  debate  by  organizing  workshops 
with decision-makers. 
The idea is to offer small-scale 
discussion rounds where decision-makers 
and House of Finance researchers talk in 
an open way about controversial themes. 
This  again  will  deliver  the  necessary 
input for future research and will also 
show where further expertise is needed.
In setting up the basic structure of the   
project, invaluable advice was received 
from Hermann Remsperger, a long time 
adjunct Professor in the Economics and 
Business Department of the University, 
and also a long time Chairman of CFS’ 
Research Advisory Council.
 
More details can be found on the website: 
www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/policy_platform, 
You can also contact us by email: 
policy-platform@hof.uni-frankfurt.de
    Click on www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/policy_platform
Policy Platform
with decision-makers. 
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A more extensive version of the article appeared in Börsen-Zeitung 
on 21 November 2009 under the heading “Nationale Souveränität in 
Aufsichtsfragen überdenken” as part of a series on financial markets 
regulation entitled “Eine neue Ordnung für die Finanzmärkte”.
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Systemic Risk: the Dual Challenge
by Jan Krahnen and Marcel Bluhm
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 Mit dem Ausbruch der Finanzkrise im Jahre 2007 sind die Begriffe „sys- temisches Risiko“ und „makropru- denzielle Aufsicht“ in den Mittel- punkt vieler Analysen und Lösungs- ansätze gerückt. Das bedeutet nicht, dass diese Konzepte neu wären. Be- reits in früheren Finanzkrisen wurde ihnen zentrale Bedeutung beigemes-
sen – jedoch ohne dass dies zu not- wendigen Reformen in Regulierung und Aufsicht geführt hätte. Und ob- wohl diese Terminologie mittler- weile in aller Munde ist, scheint nach wie vor häufig nicht völlig klar zu sein, was mit systemischem Ri- siko überhaupt gemeint ist, wie man es messen kann und welche Maßnah- men geeignet sind, um angemessen darauf zu reagieren. Wir sehen hier eine doppelte Herausforderung, die sowohl die Politik als auch die Wis- senschaftbetrifft, einerseits dieErfas- sung (Messung, Interpretation) ei- nes systemischen Risikos und ande- rerseitsdessen Verknüpfung mit kon- kreten Maßnahmen der Aufsicht. Wir verstehen unter systemischem Risiko die Gefahr, dass durch Aus- fälle im Finanzsystem eine ausrei- chende Versorgung der Märkte mit Krediten und Finanzdienstleistun- gen nicht mehr gewährleistet ist, so- dass sich negative realwirtschaftli- che Effekte ergeben. Dieses Risiko entsteht zum Beispiel dann, wenn große Teile des Finanzsystems von der Insolvenz bedroht sind. Das Fi- nanzsystem umfasst hierbei nicht nur Banken und Versicherungen, sondern auch das sogenannte Schat- tenbanksystem – zum Beispiel Hedgefonds, Geldfonds, Zweckge-
sellschaften etc. –, das bisher nicht derselben strengen Regulierung und Aufsicht unterliegt. Die Institute ei- nes Finanzsystems sind über ein komplexes, schwer durchschaubares Geflecht gegenseitiger Forderungen und Verbindlichkeiten, zum Beispiel über Kreditbeziehungen und deren Derivate, miteinander verbunden. Zusätzlich mögen Institute in diesel- ben Produktklassen investiert ha- ben, was das System als Ganzes ho- mogener und somit verwundbarer gegenüber einzelnen Risiken macht. Im Verlauf der gegenwärtigen Krise war systemisches Risiko im Sinne potenzieller Schadensereignis- se an manchen Tagen förmlich mit den Händen zu greifen. So etwa, als Lehman Brothers seine Finanzie- rungsbasis verlor und als wenig spä- ter der Versicherungskonzern AIG unter der Last vielfältig eingegange- ner Kreditabsicherungen in die Knie ging. Aufgrund der Undurchsichtig- keit strukturierter Finanzprodukte konnte niemand mit Sicherheit sa- gen, welchen Banken letztendlich Verluste drohten – es kam zu einem Vertrauensverlust, der ohne den un- verzüglichen Eingriff von Zentral- bank und Regierung zu einem In- farkt der weltweiten Finanzmärkte geführt hätte.
Beschreibt man das Finanzsystem als ein Netzwerk verflochtener, von- einander abhängiger Finanzinsti- tute, dann lassen sich die Auslöser systemischen Risikos somit genauer benennen. Systemisches Risiko er- gibt sich, wenn (a) mit der Krise ein- zelner Institute, (b) durch von ge- genseitigen Abhängigkeiten ausge- löste Insolvenzen oder (c) durch hohe Ausfälle in Produktklassen, in die ein Großteil der Finanzinstitute investiert hat, ein signifikanter Teil des Finanzsystems in den Konkurs getrieben zu werden droht. Systemi- sches Risiko resultiert daher ganz wesentlich aus der finanziellen Ver- flechtung zwischen Finanzinstitutio-
nen. Hieraus folgt, dass sich das Aus- maß des systemischen Risikos nicht allein durch mikroprudenzielle Auf-
sicht – die Überwachung der Risiko- situation einzelner Institute – ab- schätzen lässt.
Um systemisches Risiko zu mes- sen, bedarf es einer Karte des Finanz- systems, die die wichtigsten Institute und deren Vernetzung untereinan- der erfasst. Die von de0r Bundesre- gierung eingesetzte Issing-Kommis- sion hat solch eine Darstellung zur Messung von systemweiten Risiken
als „Risikolandkarte“ bezeichnet. Um eine derartige Risikolandkarte zu erstellen, benötigt die mit makro- prudenzieller Auf- sicht beauftragte Institution eine Liste aller (größe- ren) Forderungen und Verbindlich- keiten der einzel- nen Finanzinsti- tute untereinan- der. Mithilfe die- ser und weiterer Angaben lassen sich die Auswir- kungen eines brei- ten Spektrums möglicher Stress-Szenarien untersu- chen, um darauf basierend das syste- mische Gesamtrisiko zu messen und den Beitrag einzelner Finanzinsti- tute zu ermitteln. Die zweite Herausforderung ne- ben der Messung des systemischen Risikos betrifft das Ergreifen von Maßnahmen zur Begrenzung syste- mischer Risiken. Es reicht nämlich nicht aus, dass die Aufsichtsbehörde lediglich auf das ermittelte systemi- sche Risiko hinweist. Die Stabilität des Finanzsystems ist ein öffentli- chesGut, und häufighaben weder in- dividuelle Finanzinstitute noch de- ren Heimatstaaten ausreichend An- reize, entsprechenden Indikationen angemessene Maßnahmen folgen zu lassen.
Um dieser Problematik Rechnung zu tragen, ist ein Verfahren zu fin- den, bei dem sich die beteiligten Län- der vorab verpflichten („binden“), entsprechend den Meldungen der makroprudenziellen Aufsicht vorher festgelegte Maßnahmen tatsächlich zu ergreifen. Maßnahmen könnten eine Art „systemic risk charge“, eine Risikoprämie zusätzlich zu der vom Einlagensicherungsfonds verlangten Prämie, umfassen. Auch direkte Ver- knüpfungen der Diagnose mit den Mindestkapitalanforderungen der
Banken sind vorstellbar. Gegenwär- tig existiert allerdings dieses ent- scheidende Bindeglied von Diag- nose zu Prophylaxe noch nicht. Um „verdrahtete“ („hard-wired“) Reak- tion auf die Meldungen systemi- schen Risikos zu schaffen, wäre es beispielsweise möglich, den im Sep- tember dieses Jahres beschlossenen Europäischen Ausschuss für System- risiken entsprechend zu ermächti- gen. Dies würde weitreichende ge- setzliche Anpassungen erfordern, wie sie im Rahmen der Europäisie- rung der Bankenaufsicht aber eben- falls erforderlich sind. Es ergeben sich somit zwei Schlussfolgerungen in Bezug auf ei- ne zukünftige frühzeitige Erkennung und Eindämmung systemischer Risi- ken. Zum einen müssen die fachli- chen, organisatorischenund gesetzli- chen Voraussetzungen geschaffen werden, um die skizzierte Risiko- landkarte erstellen und systemisches Risiko überhaupt erfassen zu kön- nen. Wenn darüber hinaus eine sys- temstabilisierende Wirkung erzielt werden soll, bedarf es des politi- schen Willens, von politisch unab- hängiger Seite bilanzielle Anpassun- gen bei allen systemrelevanten Insti- tuten anordnen und durchsetzen zu können – ein klares Abweichen von der bisher in bankaufsichtsrechtli- chen Fragen verfolgten nationalen Souveränität. Während die erste He- rausforderung aufgegriffen worden ist und wir erste Fortschritte erken- nen können, fehlt es bei der zweiten Herausforderung noch an Konzep- ten und vor allem an einem entspre- chenden politischen Willen.
Jan Pieter Krahnen ist Finanzprofes- sor an der Goethe Universität Frank- furt und Direktor des Center for Fi- nancial Studies (CFS) im House of Fi- nance; Marcel Bluhm ist wissen- schaftlicher Mitarbeiter am CFS.
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Jan Pieter
Krahnen
und Marcel Bluhm
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 Bloomberg Singapur – Einige asia- tischeLänder denken über Kapital- kontrollen nach. Damit wollen sie denZustrom von spekulativen Gel- dern begrenzen, die zu einer Bla- senbildung bei Vermögenswerten und einer Aufwertung ihrer Wäh- rungen führen könnten.
Politiker und Notenbanker aus In- dien, Südkorea und Indonesien ha- ben sich besorgt über den Zustrom von Geldern in ihre Märkte geäu- ßert, der die Preise von Aktien, Im- mobilien und anderen Vermögens- werten nach oben getrieben hat. Tai- wan verbot zuletzt ausländischen In- vestoren, Geld in Festgeldkonten an- zulegen, weil das Land Devisenspe- kulationen befürchtet.
Ursache derEntwicklung ist die re- lativ gute Konjunktur in Asien. Die Politiker befürchten, dass die höhe- ren Währungskurse das Export- wachstum abwürgen sowie Kapital- zuflüsse ermutigen, was die Infla- tion anheizen und die finanzielle Sta- bilität untergraben würde. „Wenn die asiatischen Zentralbanken aus diesen Befürchtungen heraus han- deln, wird das beträchtliche Auswir- kungen auf die Währungen inderRe- gion haben“, sagt Mitul Kotecha, De- visen-Chef bei Calyon in Hongkong. Acht der zehn von Bloomberg ana- lysierten asiatischen Währungen ha- ben 2009 gegenüber dem Dollar an Wert gewonnen. Angeführt wird die Liste von der indonesischen Rupie, dem südkoreanischen Won und der indischen Rupie. In einigen asiati-
schen Ländern steigen die Eigen- heimpreise, auch die Aktienmärkte der Region haben zugelegt. Seit März ist der MSCI Asia Pacific Index um 66% geklettert.
„Diese Länder könnten natürlich die Zinsen erhöhen, um die Inflation unddie Preisanstiege bei Vermögens- werten einzudämmen“, sagt Nor- man Chan, Leiter der Währungsbe-
hörde von Hongkong. „Aber sie be- fürchten, dass danach noch mehr Carry Trades eingegangen werden, was noch mehr Kapital locken würde. Die Volkswirtschaften ste- cken daher in einem Dilemma.“ Bei Carry Trades nehmen Investoren Ka- pital in einem Niedrigzinsland auf, um es dann in einem anderen Land in höher rentierliche Aktiva anzule- gen. Brasilien hat letzten Monat als erstes Land Schritte zur Eindäm- mung spekulativer Gelder ergriffen. Esführte eine Steuer von 2%auf aus- ländische Käufe von festverzinsli- chen Papieren und Aktien ein. In- dien wird ebenfalls Maßnahmen zur Begrenzung des Kapitalzustroms er- greifen, wenn die ausländischen In- vestments ansteigen, erklärte Finanz- minister Ashok Chawla.
Zuletzt erschienen: � Claudio Borio: Unkonventionelle Geldpolitik birgt Risiken (Teil 11) � Dieter Wermuth: Hohe Bankgewinne sind ein Zeichen für Marktversagen (Teil 12) � Hyun Song Shin: Geldpolitik und Finanzstabilität gehören zusammen (Teil 13)
In den Zusatzdiensten von boersen-zeitung.de finden Sie die bisher erschienenen Serienbeiträge in deutscher wie auch in englischer Sprache.
Serie (Teil 14)
Nationale Souveränität in Aufsichtsfragen überdenken
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 cr Brüssel – Frankreich hat im Kreis der Euro-Staaten eine Niederlage einstecken müssen. Nach Informatio- nen der Börsen-Zeitung hat sich der mächtige Wirtschafts- und Finanz- ausschuss (WFA), in dem sich hoch- rangige Vertreter der Finanzministe- rien und der Notenbanken abstim- men, gegen den Vorstoß der Pariser Regierung gestellt, den Abbau der Neuverschuldung bis 2014 zu stre- cken. Frankreich soll, wie von der EU-Kommission vorgeschlagen, nur bis 2013 Zeit bekommen, das Defizit unter die Marke von 3% des Brutto- inlandsprodukts zu drücken. Die Po- sitionierung bei Frankreich war
Gradmesser für die Bereitschaft der Währungsunion, die explodierenden Schulden in den Euro-Staaten we- gen der Finanzkrise in den Griff zu bekommen. Hätten die Euro-Partner Frankreich Zugeständnisse gemacht, hätten weitere Länder die Haushalts- konsolidierung schleifen lassen. EU- Kommissar Joaquín Almunia hatte zuletzt noch einmal an Paris appel- liert, die Sparanstrengungen zu for- cieren (vgl. BZ vom 12. November). Ebenso wie Paris muss auch Berlin die Neuverschuldung bis 2013 Maastricht-konform ausrichten. Fi- nanzminister Wolfgang Schäuble hatte bereits signalisiert, Deutsch- land werde die EU-Vorgabe erfüllen.
Personen heute auf Seite 13
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 js Frankfurt – Das Centrum für Euro- päische Politik (CEP) in Freiburg for- dert eine Änderung der personellen Zusammensetzung des geplanten eu- ropäischen Systemrisikorats, der für die Aufsicht der Finanzmarktstabili- tät in Europa zuständig sein soll. „Die personelle Zusammensetzung des ESRB-Verwaltungsrates verur- sacht Interessenkonflikte: Nationale Zentralbanken, europäische Auf- sichtsbehörden und die EU-Kommis- sion können von selbst ausgespro- chenen Warnungen und Empfehlun- gen betroffen sein“, heißt es in einer CEP-Studie, die der Börsen-Zeitung vorliegt. Der sogenannte European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) soll als Frühwarnsystem auf Gefahren im Fi- nanzsystem hinweisen. Daneben will die EU-Kommission auch drei neue europäische Aufsichtsbehör- den für Banken, Versicherungen und Wertpapiermärkte einrichten. Da auch die europäischen Aufsichts- behörden und ein EU-Kommissions- mitglied im ESRB-Verwaltungsrat sind, befürchtet das CEP Interessen- konflikte. Fragwürdig sei, „dass ein Mitglied der Kommission als stimm- berechtigtes Mitglied des ESRB sei- nem eigenen Organ ,Empfehlungen zum einschlägigen Gemeinschafts- recht‘ machen kann“, heißt es in der Studie. Das Kommissionsmitglied könne so den ESRB dazu nutzen, von der Kommission verfolgte politi- sche Ziele durch den ESRB rechtfer- tigen zu lassen. „Dies schwächt letzt- endlich aber die Autorität des ESRB“, kritisiert das CEP. Stattdes- sen empfehlen die Wissenschaftler des Instituts ein neues Gremium, das sich aus dem sechsköpfigen Di- rektorium der Europäischen Zentral- bank (EZB) sowie aus vier Zentral- bankvertretern der Nicht-Euro-Staa- ten zusammensetzen soll. Letztere sollten in ihrem Heimatland aber über keine Zuständigkeit für die Bankenaufsicht verfügen. Der Ver- waltungsrat könnte dann Vor- schläge für Entscheidungen unter- breiten, so das CEP.
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 ks Frankfurt – Der Preisverfall auf der Erzeugerebene setzt sich unver- mindert fort. Im Oktober kosteten In- dustrieprodukte im Inlandsabsatz 7,6% weniger als ein Jahr zuvor, wie das Statistische Bundesamt (De- statis) mitteilte. Im September hatte die Jahresveränderungsrate eben- falls minus 7,6% betragen. Gegen- über September blieb der Index im Oktober unverändert. Den höchsten Einfluss auf die Jah- resteuerungsrate hatte im Oktober Destatis zufolge weiterhin die Preis- entwicklung bei der Energie. Fast drei Viertel der Veränderung des Gesamtindex gegenüber Oktober 2008 seien darauf zurückzuführen, teilten die Wiesbadener Statistiker mit. Die Preise für Energie lagen um 16,6% unter denen des Vorjahres, stiegen jedoch gegenüber dem Vor- monat um 0,3%. Ohne Berücksichti- gung von Energie sanken die Erzeu- gerpreise im Jahresvergleich um 3,3% und gegenüber September 2009 um 0,1%. Von den drei Hauptenergieträ- gern kostete Erdgas 32,9% weniger als ein Jahr zuvor, Mineralölerzeug- nisse 12,4% und Strom 9,5%. Vor- leistungsgüter waren um 6,1% billi-
ger. Zu diesem Rückgang trugen in besonderem Maße die Preise für Metalle bei. Sie lagen um 17,9% niedriger. Für chemische Grund- stoffe war im Schnitt 7,3% weniger zu bezahlen. Verbrauchsgüter verbil- ligten sich um 2,8%.
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 js Frankfurt – Die Europäische Zen- tralbank (EZB) verschärft die Re- geln, nach denen forderungsbesi- cherte Anleihen als Sicherheiten für Refinanzierungsgeschäfte der Ban- ken bei der Notenbank eingereicht werden dürfen. Wie die EZB in Frankfurt am Freitag mitteilte, wür- den konkret die Rating-Anforderun- gen für Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), die bei Kreditgeschäften des Eurosystems zugelassen sind, geän- dert. Refinanzierungsfähige ABS müssen künftig nicht nur ein, son- dern zwei hochklassige Ratings (AAA/aaa) aufweisen, wie die EZB am Freitag in Frankfurt mitteilte. Die Regelung tritt für Papiere in Kraft,die ab dem 1. März2010 bege- ben werden. Ein Jahr später gilt die neue Regel für alle ABS, unabhängig von ihrem Emissionsdatum. Die EZB hatte die Rating-Anforderungen für ABS gelockert, um den Banken auch während der Finanzkrise den Zu- gang zur Notenbankliquidität sicher- zustellen. Ziel der Maßnahmen sei, zur Wiederherstellung eines rei- bungslos funktionierenden ABS- Marktes beizutragen und zu gewähr- leisten, dassnotenbankfähige Sicher- heiten die hohen Bonitätsanforde- rungen des Eurosystems erfüllen.
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 mf Tokio – Die japanische Volks- wirtschaft ist nach Ansicht der Re- gierung in Tokio in die Deflation zurückgefallen. Im Wirtschaftsbe- richt für November wird das „D-Wort“ erstmalsseit dreieinhalb Jahren wieder erwähnt; von der Notenbank werden entsprechende monetäre Reaktionen gefordert.
„Die Deflationbirgt ernsthafte Risi- ken“, zeigte sich Finanzminister Hi- rohisa Fujii besorgt. Die Notenbank solle „angemessene“ Gegenmaßnah- men ergreifen und die Nachfrage von Firmen und Verbrauchern mit billigem Geld ankurbeln. Vizepre- mierminister Naoto Kan warnte die Zentralbank vor einer verfrühten Exit-Politik.
Doch die Währungshüter spielten den Ball zurück. „Solange die Nach- frage schwach ist, werden die Preise nicht deshalb steigen, nur weil genü- gend Liquidität vorhanden ist“, be- tonte Gouverneur Masaaki Shira- kawa nach einer Sitzung des geldpo-
litischen Rats in Tokio. Damit kriti- sierte er indirekt die Regierung, die versprochen hat, den Privatkonsum durch niedrigere Abgaben und hö- here Sozialleistungen zu stärken. Die Finanzmittel dafür hat sie bisher aber nicht aufgebracht. Konkret spricht der Monatsbericht von einer „milden deflationären Phase“. Als Belege nannte Staatsse- kretär Keisuke Tsumura den seit sie- ben Monaten anhaltenden Preisrück- gang von zuletzt 2,3% im Septem- ber sowie die Kluft zwischen Ange- bot und Nachfrage von 7,4% im zweiten Quartal. Außerdem wachse die Wirtschaft nur real wie im drit- ten Quartal um 1,2%, während sie nominal um0,3% schrumpfte. Trotz- dem sieht die Notenbank bisher keine Gefahr für eine Deflationsspi- rale aus fallenden Preisen und Kon- sumzurückhaltung. Für die nächsten drei Jahre erwartet sie Preisrück- gänge von 1,5%, dann von 0,8% und schließlich von 0,4%. Die erste Phase sinkender Preise dauerte von März 2001 bis Juni 2006.
Shirakawabekräftigte zwar, Regie- rung und Notenbank hätten dieselbe Einschätzung zur Preisentwicklung. Doch er wird die Geldpolitik weiter lockern müssen. Als eine Möglich- keit gilt der verstärkte Ankauf lang- laufender Staatsanleihen. Dadurch käme mehr Geld in Umlauf und die Preiserwartungen würden erhöht. Weil dabeiauch die langfristigenZin- sen fallen, hätte die Regierung da- von zugleich den Vorteil, sich billi- ger neu verschulden zu können. Der- zeit nimmt die Bank von Japan mo- natlich Anleihen für bis zu 1,8 Bill. Yen (13,6 Mrd. Euro) vom Markt.
Leitzins bleibt bei 0,1 Prozent
Auchin der Einschätzung der Kon- junktur liegen Regierung und Noten- bank auseinander. Während der Mo- natsbericht des Kabinetts von einer „schwierigen Situation“ für die Wirt- schaft spricht, beobachten die Wäh- rungshüter bereits eine „anzie- hende“ Wirtschaft. Der Leitzins wurde jedoch bei 0,1% belassen.
Asien erwägt Beschränkungen im Kapitalverkehr
Zustrom ausländischer Investments lässt Währungskurse steigen – Regierungen befürchten Preisblasen
EU bleibt bei Frankreich hart Kein Zusatzjahr zur Budgetkonsolidierung für Paris
Institut kritisiert Systemrisikorat
Deutsche Erzeugerpreise sinken unvermindert Energiepreise weiter erheblich unter Vorjahresniveau
EZB verschärft Regeln für ABS
Japanische Regierung ruft offiziell die Deflation aus Streit mit Bank von Japan über notwendige Gegenmaßnahmen
Sonnabend, 21. November 2009
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The  concepts  of  “systemic  risk”  and 
“macro  prudential  supervision”  have 
become the focus of attention in many 
studies. This does not mean that these 
concepts  are  new.  Already  in  earlier 
crises  they  were  believed  to  be  of 
central importance, without, however, 
this  ever  having  led  to  the  necessary 
reforms in regulation and supervision. 
And  although  the  terminology  is  on 
everyone’s lips, it still frequently appears 
to be unclear what systemic risk means, 
how  it  can  be  quantified,  and  which 
measures are suitable in order to be able 
to respond appropriately to it. 
What we are observing here is a dual 
challenge  that  concerns  policymakers, 
particularly those at the central banks. 
These  challenges  involve,  on  the  one 
hand,  determining  (quantifying  and 
interpreting) systemic risk and, on the 
other  hand,  devising  applications 
that  will  lead  to  concrete  measures 
for supervision.   
By  systemic  risk  we  understand  the 
danger that failures within the financial 
system  will  mean  that  an  adequate 
supply  of  credit  and  financial  services 
to the markets is no longer guaranteed, 
so that negative real effects will follow. 
This  risk  arises  when,  for  example, 
large sectors of the financial system are 
threatened with insolvency. The finan-
cial system in this context is perceived 
as  a  network  of  interwoven,  mutually 
dependent  financial  institutions  –  not 
only banks and insurances but also the 
so-called shadow banking system such 
as  hedge  funds,  mass  money  funds, 
special  purpose  vehicles.  If  systemic 
risk  essentially  derives  from  the 
financial  linkage  between  financial 
institutions,  it  follows  from  this  that 
the  extent  of  systemic  risk  cannot  be 
determined through the supervision of 
individual institutions. In this context, 
conventional supervision, referred to as 
micro prudential supervision, is simply 
not up to the task.  
The  Issing  commission  set  up  by  the 
German government coined the phrase 
“risk  map”  for  measuring  the  system-
wide  risks  of  the  financial  system. 
Such a diagram of the financial system 
would  capture  the  most  important 
institutions  and  their  mutual  claims 
and liabilities in connection with other 
institutions within the financial sector. 
This  and  other  information  would 
enable  the  supervisory  authority  to 
measure the systemic total risk and to 
determine the role played by individual 
institutions.  However,  the  necessary 
analysis  methods  required  here  still 
have  to  be  developed.  Central  banks 
and  academic  research  institutes  have 
already begun to examine these issues 
but at present the systemically defined 
risk analysis remains a challenge – both 
intellectually as well as in the context 
of its legal and organizational aspects. 
The latter refers to the need to design a 
uniform approach to the collection and 
compilation of data under the auspices 
of  a  single  responsible  body  such  as 
the  ESRB  or  the  IMF.  In  the  case  of 
Germany, fundamental legal regulations 
still stand in the way. The Bundesbank, 
for  example,  is  not  permitted  to  pass 
institution-specific  data  on  to  a  third 
party – not even to the ESRB.   
The  second  challenge  besides  the 
quantification of systemic risk concerns 
the  adopting  of  measures  aimed  at 
containing  systemic  risks.  Essentially, 
it is not sufficient for the supervisory 
authority to simply point out the sys-
temic risks it has detected. The stability 
of  the  financial  system  is  a  public 
good and frequently neither individual 
finance  institutions  nor  their  country 
of  origin  have  sufficient  incentives 
to  pursue  pertinent  indications  with 
appropriate  measures.  In  order  to 
deal with this problem, a procedure is 
required  through  which  the  countries 
involved  commit  themselves  ex  ante 
to  implementing  specific  pre-agreed 
measures. These measures could include 
a  kind  of  ‘systemic  risk  charge’,  i.e. 
a  risk  premium  in  addition  to  that 
required by the deposit insurance funds. 
A direct coupling of banks’ minimum 
capital  requirements  to  the  ESRB 
evaluation is also conceivable.  
At the current time, however, this cru-
cial step from diagnosis to prophylactic 
measures is nonexistent. And it is exactly 
here that we observe the second challenge 
mentioned above, that is the creation of 5
For the first time since mid 2008, the 
CFS Financial Center Index has shown 
a  positive  value  of  currently  103.6 
(+5.2  points).  The  previous  quarter 
had  already  indicated  a  turnaround 
but  now  there  is  first  evidence  of  a 
recovery in the financial sector and a 
rise in the creation of value. 
 
Consistently across all areas surveyed, 
the financial business climate is being 
viewed  much  more  positively.  While 
the evaluation of the performance for 
the third quarter of 2009 is still rather 
cautious, the positive effect is revealed in 
the fourth quarter forecast, particularly 
with  regard  to  transaction  volumes 
(+8.9 points) and profits (+6.6 points) 
for  the  whole  financial  sector.  The 
business sentiment that prevails in the 
“supervisory and academic institutions” 
subgroup, which was notably negative 
in  the  last  survey,  has  now  swiftly 
brightened  up  again.  Financial  sector 
service providers, such as accountants 
and  consultants,  even  assume  there 
will  be  a  small  rise  in  employment 
and  an  increase  in  investments.  As 
observed already in last year’s survey, 
a majority of respondents still believe
that the economic and financial crisis 
will  continue  for  up  to  three  years. 
“Despite the strong increase of the index 
value, reflecting a significant recovery 
of the financial sector, the sustainability 
of  the  business  performance  is  called 
into question by additional uncertainties 
following the ongoing crisis”, explained 
CFS  Director  Jan  Pieter  Krahnen 
commenting on the latest results. 
Concerns about the economic 
costs of financial regulation
The special survey conducted this time 
dealt  with  the  financial  crisis  and  its 
consequences.  496  leading  executives 
were  asked  about  their  expectations 
regarding the duration of the crisis, as 
well  as  their  views  on  the  regulation 
of  securitizations,  the  marking-to-
market of assets, and remuneration of 
managers.
Effectiveness of limiting 
executive compensations 
remains questionable
For  an  overwhelming  number  of 
respondents,  the  measures  adopted 
in  Pittsburgh  to  limit  executive  com-
pensation will not help to prevent future 
financial crises. A small majority (51%) 
judges this G20 decision to be ineffective, 
an  additional  9  %  even  consider  it  to 
be  counterproductive  for  financial 
stability.  “Although  understandable 
from a political perspective, the regu-
lation  of  management  salaries  is  seen 
predominantly  as  an  inappropriate 
instrument for reducing the risk of future 
financial crises”, stated Krahnen.
CFS Financial Center Index | Research and Policy
CFS Financial Center Index continues upward trend
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 Mit dem Ausbruch der Finanzkrise im Jahre 2007 sind die Begriffe „sys- temisches Risiko“ und „makropru- denzielle Aufsicht“ in den Mittel- punkt vieler Analysen und Lösungs- ansätze gerückt. Das bedeutet nicht, dass diese Konzepte neu wären. Be- reits in früheren Finanzkrisen wurde ihnen zentrale Bedeutung beigemes-
sen – jedoch ohne dass dies zu not- wendigen Reformen in Regulierung und Aufsicht geführt hätte. Und ob- wohl diese Terminologie mittler- weile in aller Munde ist, scheint nach wie vor häufig nicht völlig klar zu sein, was mit systemischem Ri- siko überhaupt gemeint ist, wie man es messen kann und welche Maßnah- men geeignet sind, um angemessen darauf zu reagieren. Wir sehen hier eine doppelte Herausforderung, die sowohl die Politik als auch die Wis- senschaftbetrifft, einerseits dieErfas- sung (Messung, Interpretation) ei- nes systemischen Risikos und ande- rerseitsdessen Verknüpfung mit kon- kreten Maßnahmen der Aufsicht. Wir verstehen unter systemischem Risiko die Gefahr, dass durch Aus- fälle im Finanzsystem eine ausrei- chende Versorgung der Märkte mit Krediten und Finanzdienstleistun- gen nicht mehr gewährleistet ist, so- dass sich negative realwirtschaftli- che Effekte ergeben. Dieses Risiko entsteht zum Beispiel dann, wenn große Teile des Finanzsystems von der Insolvenz bedroht sind. Das Fi- nanzsystem umfasst hierbei nicht nur Banken und Versicherungen, sondern auch das sogenannte Schat- tenbanksystem – zum Beispiel Hedgefonds, Geldfonds, Zweckge-
sellschaften etc. –, das bisher nicht derselben strengen Regulierung und Aufsicht unterliegt. Die Institute ei- nes Finanzsystems sind über ein komplexes, schwer durchschaubares Geflecht gegenseitiger Forderungen und Verbindlichkeiten, zum Beispiel über Kreditbeziehungen und deren Derivate, miteinander verbunden. Zusätzlich mögen Institute in diesel- ben Produktklassen investiert ha- ben, was das System als Ganzes ho- mogener und somit verwundbarer gegenüber einzelnen Risiken macht. Im Verlauf der gegenwärtigen Krise war systemisches Risiko im Sinne potenzieller Schadensereignis- se an manchen Tagen förmlich mit den Händen zu greifen. So etwa, als Lehman Brothers seine Finanzie- rungsbasis verlor und als wenig spä- ter der Versicherungskonzern AIG unter der Last vielfältig eingegange- ner Kreditabsicherungen in die Knie ging. Aufgrund der Undurchsichtig- keit strukturierter Finanzprodukte konnte niemand mit Sicherheit sa- gen, welchen Banken letztendlich Verluste drohten – es kam zu einem Vertrauensverlust, der ohne den un- verzüglichen Eingriff von Zentral- bank und Regierung zu einem In- farkt der weltweiten Finanzmärkte geführt hätte.
Beschreibt man das Finanzsystem als ein Netzwerk verflochtener, von- einander abhängiger Finanzinsti- tute, dann lassen sich die Auslöser systemischen Risikos somit genauer benennen. Systemisches Risiko er- gibt sich, wenn (a) mit der Krise ein- zelner Institute, (b) durch von ge- genseitigen Abhängigkeiten ausge- löste Insolvenzen oder (c) durch hohe Ausfälle in Produktklassen, in die ein Großteil der Finanzinstitute investiert hat, ein signifikanter Teil des Finanzsystems in den Konkurs getrieben zu werden droht. Systemi- sches Risiko resultiert daher ganz wesentlich aus der finanziellen Ver- flechtung zwischen Finanzinstitutio-
nen. Hieraus folgt, dass sich das Aus- maß des systemischen Risikos nicht allein durch mikroprudenzielle Auf-
sicht – die Überwachung der Risiko- situation einzelner Institute – ab- schätzen lässt.
Um systemisches Risiko zu mes- sen, bedarf es einer Karte des Finanz- systems, die die wichtigsten Institute und deren Vernetzung untereinan- der erfasst. Die von de0r Bundesre- gierung eingesetzte Issing-Kommis- sion hat solch eine Darstellung zur Messung von systemweiten Risiken
als „Risikolandkarte“ bezeichnet. Um eine derartige Risikolandkarte zu erstellen, benötigt die mit makro- prudenzieller Auf- sicht beauftragte Institution eine Liste aller (größe- ren) Forderungen und Verbindlich- keiten der einzel- nen Finanzinsti- tute untereinan- der. Mithilfe die- ser und weiterer Angaben lassen sich die Auswir- kungen eines brei- ten Spektrums möglicher Stress-Szenarien untersu- chen, um darauf basierend das syste- mische Gesamtrisiko zu messen und den Beitrag einzelner Finanzinsti- tute zu ermitteln. Die zweite Herausforderung ne- ben der Messung des systemischen Risikos betrifft das Ergreifen von Maßnahmen zur Begrenzung syste- mischer Risiken. Es reicht nämlich nicht aus, dass die Aufsichtsbehörde lediglich auf das ermittelte systemi- sche Risiko hinweist. Die Stabilität des Finanzsystems ist ein öffentli- chesGut, und häufighaben weder in- dividuelle Finanzinstitute noch de- ren Heimatstaaten ausreichend An- reize, entsprechenden Indikationen angemessene Maßnahmen folgen zu lassen.
Um dieser Problematik Rechnung zu tragen, ist ein Verfahren zu fin- den, bei dem sich die beteiligten Län- der vorab verpflichten („binden“), entsprechend den Meldungen der makroprudenziellen Aufsicht vorher festgelegte Maßnahmen tatsächlich zu ergreifen. Maßnahmen könnten eine Art „systemic risk charge“, eine Risikoprämie zusätzlich zu der vom Einlagensicherungsfonds verlangten Prämie, umfassen. Auch direkte Ver- knüpfungen der Diagnose mit den Mindestkapitalanforderungen der
Banken sind vorstellbar. Gegenwär- tig existiert allerdings dieses ent- scheidende Bindeglied von Diag- nose zu Prophylaxe noch nicht. Um „verdrahtete“ („hard-wired“) Reak- tion auf die Meldungen systemi- schen Risikos zu schaffen, wäre es beispielsweise möglich, den im Sep- tember dieses Jahres beschlossenen Europäischen Ausschuss für System- risiken entsprechend zu ermächti- gen. Dies würde weitreichende ge- setzliche Anpassungen erfordern, wie sie im Rahmen der Europäisie- rung der Bankenaufsicht aber eben- falls erforderlich sind. Es ergeben sich somit zwei Schlussfolgerungen in Bezug auf ei- ne zukünftige frühzeitige Erkennung und Eindämmung systemischer Risi- ken. Zum einen müssen die fachli- chen, organisatorischenund gesetzli- chen Voraussetzungen geschaffen werden, um die skizzierte Risiko- landkarte erstellen und systemisches Risiko überhaupt erfassen zu kön- nen. Wenn darüber hinaus eine sys- temstabilisierende Wirkung erzielt werden soll, bedarf es des politi- schen Willens, von politisch unab- hängiger Seite bilanzielle Anpassun- gen bei allen systemrelevanten Insti- tuten anordnen und durchsetzen zu können – ein klares Abweichen von der bisher in bankaufsichtsrechtli- chen Fragen verfolgten nationalen Souveränität. Während die erste He- rausforderung aufgegriffen worden ist und wir erste Fortschritte erken- nen können, fehlt es bei der zweiten Herausforderung noch an Konzep- ten und vor allem an einem entspre- chenden politischen Willen.
Jan Pieter Krahnen ist Finanzprofes- sor an der Goethe Universität Frank- furt und Direktor des Center for Fi- nancial Studies (CFS) im House of Fi- nance; Marcel Bluhm ist wissen- schaftlicher Mitarbeiter am CFS.
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  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 Bloomberg Singapur – Einige asia- tischeLänder denken über Kapital- kontrollen nach. Damit wollen sie denZustrom von spekulativen Gel- dern begrenzen, die zu einer Bla- senbildung bei Vermögenswerten und einer Aufwertung ihrer Wäh- rungen führen könnten.
Politiker und Notenbanker aus In- dien, Südkorea und Indonesien ha- ben sich besorgt über den Zustrom von Geldern in ihre Märkte geäu- ßert, der die Preise von Aktien, Im- mobilien und anderen Vermögens- werten nach oben getrieben hat. Tai- wan verbot zuletzt ausländischen In- vestoren, Geld in Festgeldkonten an- zulegen, weil das Land Devisenspe- kulationen befürchtet.
Ursache derEntwicklung ist die re- lativ gute Konjunktur in Asien. Die Politiker befürchten, dass die höhe- ren Währungskurse das Export- wachstum abwürgen sowie Kapital- zuflüsse ermutigen, was die Infla- tion anheizen und die finanzielle Sta- bilität untergraben würde. „Wenn die asiatischen Zentralbanken aus diesen Befürchtungen heraus han- deln, wird das beträchtliche Auswir- kungen auf die Währungen inderRe- gion haben“, sagt Mitul Kotecha, De- visen-Chef bei Calyon in Hongkong. Acht der zehn von Bloomberg ana- lysierten asiatischen Währungen ha- ben 2009 gegenüber dem Dollar an Wert gewonnen. Angeführt wird die Liste von der indonesischen Rupie, dem südkoreanischen Won und der indischen Rupie. In einigen asiati-
schen Ländern steigen die Eigen- heimpreise, auch die Aktienmärkte der Region haben zugelegt. Seit März ist der MSCI Asia Pacific Index um 66% geklettert.
„Diese Länder könnten natürlich die Zinsen erhöhen, um die Inflation unddie Preisanstiege bei Vermögens- werten einzudämmen“, sagt Nor- man Chan, Leiter der Währungsbe-
hörde von Hongkong. „Aber sie be- fürchten, dass danach noch mehr Carry Trades eingegangen werden, was noch mehr Kapital locken würde. Die Volkswirtschaften ste- cken daher in einem Dilemma.“ Bei Carry Trades nehmen Investoren Ka- pital in einem Niedrigzinsland auf, um es dann in einem anderen Land in höher rentierliche Aktiva anzule- gen. Brasilien hat letzten Monat als erstes Land Schritte zur Eindäm- mung spekulativer Gelder ergriffen. Esführte eine Steuer von 2%auf aus- ländische Käufe von festverzinsli- chen Papieren und Aktien ein. In- dien wird ebenfalls Maßnahmen zur Begrenzung des Kapitalzustroms er- greifen, wenn die ausländischen In- vestments ansteigen, erklärte Finanz- minister Ashok Chawla.
Zuletzt erschienen: � Claudio Borio: Unkonventionelle Geldpolitik birgt Risiken (Teil 11) � Dieter Wermuth: Hohe Bankgewinne sind ein Zeichen für Marktversagen (Teil 12) � Hyun Song Shin: Geldpolitik und Finanzstabilität gehören zusammen (Teil 13)
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Serie (Teil 14)
Nationale Souveränität in Aufsichtsfragen überdenken
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 cr Brüssel – Frankreich hat im Kreis der Euro-Staaten eine Niederlage einstecken müssen. Nach Informatio- nen der Börsen-Zeitung hat sich der mächtige Wirtschafts- und Finanz- ausschuss (WFA), in dem sich hoch- rangige Vertreter der Finanzministe- rien und der Notenbanken abstim- men, gegen den Vorstoß der Pariser Regierung gestellt, den Abbau der Neuverschuldung bis 2014 zu stre- cken. Frankreich soll, wie von der EU-Kommission vorgeschlagen, nur bis 2013 Zeit bekommen, das Defizit unter die Marke von 3% des Brutto- inlandsprodukts zu drücken. Die Po- sitionierung bei Frankreich war
Gradmesser für die Bereitschaft der Währungsunion, die explodierenden Schulden in den Euro-Staaten we- gen der Finanzkrise in den Griff zu bekommen. Hätten die Euro-Partner Frankreich Zugeständnisse gemacht, hätten weitere Länder die Haushalts- konsolidierung schleifen lassen. EU- Kommissar Joaquín Almunia hatte zuletzt noch einmal an Paris appel- liert, die Sparanstrengungen zu for- cieren (vgl. BZ vom 12. November). Ebenso wie Paris muss auch Berlin die Neuverschuldung bis 2013 Maastricht-konform ausrichten. Fi- nanzminister Wolfgang Schäuble hatte bereits signalisiert, Deutsch- land werde die EU-Vorgabe erfüllen.
Personen heute auf Seite 13
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 js Frankfurt – Das Centrum für Euro- päische Politik (CEP) in Freiburg for- dert eine Änderung der personellen Zusammensetzung des geplanten eu- ropäischen Systemrisikorats, der für die Aufsicht der Finanzmarktstabili- tät in Europa zuständig sein soll. „Die personelle Zusammensetzung des ESRB-Verwaltungsrates verur- sacht Interessenkonflikte: Nationale Zentralbanken, europäische Auf- sichtsbehörden und die EU-Kommis- sion können von selbst ausgespro- chenen Warnungen und Empfehlun- gen betroffen sein“, heißt es in einer CEP-Studie, die der Börsen-Zeitung vorliegt. Der sogenannte European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) soll als Frühwarnsystem auf Gefahren im Fi- nanzsystem hinweisen. Daneben will die EU-Kommission auch drei neue europäische Aufsichtsbehör- den für Banken, Versicherungen und Wertpapiermärkte einrichten. Da auch die europäischen Aufsichts- behörden und ein EU-Kommissions- mitglied im ESRB-Verwaltungsrat sind, befürchtet das CEP Interessen- konflikte. Fragwürdig sei, „dass ein Mitglied der Kommission als stimm- berechtigtes Mitglied des ESRB sei- nem eigenen Organ ,Empfehlungen zum einschlägigen Gemeinschafts- recht‘ machen kann“, heißt es in der Studie. Das Kommissionsmitglied könne so den ESRB dazu nutzen, von der Kommission verfolgte politi- sche Ziele durch den ESRB rechtfer- tigen zu lassen. „Dies schwächt letzt- endlich aber die Autorität des ESRB“, kritisiert das CEP. Stattdes- sen empfehlen die Wissenschaftler des Instituts ein neues Gremium, das sich aus dem sechsköpfigen Di- rektorium der Europäischen Zentral- bank (EZB) sowie aus vier Zentral- bankvertretern der Nicht-Euro-Staa- ten zusammensetzen soll. Letztere sollten in ihrem Heimatland aber über keine Zuständigkeit für die Bankenaufsicht verfügen. Der Ver- waltungsrat könnte dann Vor- schläge für Entscheidungen unter- breiten, so das CEP.
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 ks Frankfurt – Der Preisverfall auf der Erzeugerebene setzt sich unver- mindert fort. Im Oktober kosteten In- dustrieprodukte im Inlandsabsatz 7,6% weniger als ein Jahr zuvor, wie das Statistische Bundesamt (De- statis) mitteilte. Im September hatte die Jahresveränderungsrate eben- falls minus 7,6% betragen. Gegen- über September blieb der Index im Oktober unverändert. Den höchsten Einfluss auf die Jah- resteuerungsrate hatte im Oktober Destatis zufolge weiterhin die Preis- entwicklung bei der Energie. Fast drei Viertel der Veränderung des Gesamtindex gegenüber Oktober 2008 seien darauf zurückzuführen, teilten die Wiesbadener Statistiker mit. Die Preise für Energie lagen um 16,6% unter denen des Vorjahres, stiegen jedoch gegenüber dem Vor- monat um 0,3%. Ohne Berücksichti- gung von Energie sanken die Erzeu- gerpreise im Jahresvergleich um 3,3% und gegenüber September 2009 um 0,1%. Von den drei Hauptenergieträ- gern kostete Erdgas 32,9% weniger als ein Jahr zuvor, Mineralölerzeug- nisse 12,4% und Strom 9,5%. Vor- leistungsgüter waren um 6,1% billi-
ger. Zu diesem Rückgang trugen in besonderem Maße die Preise für Metalle bei. Sie lagen um 17,9% niedriger. Für chemische Grund- stoffe war im Schnitt 7,3% weniger zu bezahlen. Verbrauchsgüter verbil- ligten sich um 2,8%.
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 js Frankfurt – Die Europäische Zen- tralbank (EZB) verschärft die Re- geln, nach denen forderungsbesi- cherte Anleihen als Sicherheiten für Refinanzierungsgeschäfte der Ban- ken bei der Notenbank eingereicht werden dürfen. Wie die EZB in Frankfurt am Freitag mitteilte, wür- den konkret die Rating-Anforderun- gen für Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), die bei Kreditgeschäften des Eurosystems zugelassen sind, geän- dert. Refinanzierungsfähige ABS müssen künftig nicht nur ein, son- dern zwei hochklassige Ratings (AAA/aaa) aufweisen, wie die EZB am Freitag in Frankfurt mitteilte. Die Regelung tritt für Papiere in Kraft,die ab dem 1. März2010 bege- ben werden. Ein Jahr später gilt die neue Regel für alle ABS, unabhängig von ihrem Emissionsdatum. Die EZB hatte die Rating-Anforderungen für ABS gelockert, um den Banken auch während der Finanzkrise den Zu- gang zur Notenbankliquidität sicher- zustellen. Ziel der Maßnahmen sei, zur Wiederherstellung eines rei- bungslos funktionierenden ABS- Marktes beizutragen und zu gewähr- leisten, dassnotenbankfähige Sicher- heiten die hohen Bonitätsanforde- rungen des Eurosystems erfüllen.
  Börsen-Zeitung, 21.11.2009 mf Tokio – Die japanische Volks- wirtschaft ist nach Ansicht der Re- gierung in Tokio in die Deflation zurückgefallen. Im Wirtschaftsbe- richt für November wird das „D-Wort“ erstmalsseit dreieinhalb Jahren wieder erwähnt; von der Notenbank werden entsprechende monetäre Reaktionen gefordert.
„Die Deflationbirgt ernsthafte Risi- ken“, zeigte sich Finanzminister Hi- rohisa Fujii besorgt. Die Notenbank solle „angemessene“ Gegenmaßnah- men ergreifen und die Nachfrage von Firmen und Verbrauchern mit billigem Geld ankurbeln. Vizepre- mierminister Naoto Kan warnte die Zentralbank vor einer verfrühten Exit-Politik.
Doch die Währungshüter spielten den Ball zurück. „Solange die Nach- frage schwach ist, werden die Preise nicht deshalb steigen, nur weil genü- gend Liquidität vorhanden ist“, be- tonte Gouverneur Masaaki Shira- kawa nach einer Sitzung des geldpo-
litischen Rats in Tokio. Damit kriti- sierte er indirekt die Regierung, die versprochen hat, den Privatkonsum durch niedrigere Abgaben und hö- here Sozialleistungen zu stärken. Die Finanzmittel dafür hat sie bisher aber nicht aufgebracht. Konkret spricht der Monatsbericht von einer „milden deflationären Phase“. Als Belege nannte Staatsse- kretär Keisuke Tsumura den seit sie- ben Monaten anhaltenden Preisrück- gang von zuletzt 2,3% im Septem- ber sowie die Kluft zwischen Ange- bot und Nachfrage von 7,4% im zweiten Quartal. Außerdem wachse die Wirtschaft nur real wie im drit- ten Quartal um 1,2%, während sie nominal um0,3% schrumpfte. Trotz- dem sieht die Notenbank bisher keine Gefahr für eine Deflationsspi- rale aus fallenden Preisen und Kon- sumzurückhaltung. Für die nächsten drei Jahre erwartet sie Preisrück- gänge von 1,5%, dann von 0,8% und schließlich von 0,4%. Die erste Phase sinkender Preise dauerte von März 2001 bis Juni 2006.
Shirakawabekräftigte zwar, Regie- rung und Notenbank hätten dieselbe Einschätzung zur Preisentwicklung. Doch er wird die Geldpolitik weiter lockern müssen. Als eine Möglich- keit gilt der verstärkte Ankauf lang- laufender Staatsanleihen. Dadurch käme mehr Geld in Umlauf und die Preiserwartungen würden erhöht. Weil dabeiauch die langfristigenZin- sen fallen, hätte die Regierung da- von zugleich den Vorteil, sich billi- ger neu verschulden zu können. Der- zeit nimmt die Bank von Japan mo- natlich Anleihen für bis zu 1,8 Bill. Yen (13,6 Mrd. Euro) vom Markt.
Leitzins bleibt bei 0,1 Prozent
Auchin der Einschätzung der Kon- junktur liegen Regierung und Noten- bank auseinander. Während der Mo- natsbericht des Kabinetts von einer „schwierigen Situation“ für die Wirt- schaft spricht, beobachten die Wäh- rungshüter bereits eine „anzie- hende“ Wirtschaft. Der Leitzins wurde jedoch bei 0,1% belassen.
Asien erwägt Beschränkungen im Kapitalverkehr
Zustrom ausländischer Investments lässt Währungskurse steigen – Regierungen befürchten Preisblasen
EU bleibt bei Frankreich hart Kein Zusatzjahr zur Budgetkonsolidierung für Paris
Institut kritisiert Systemrisikorat
Deutsche Erzeugerpreise sinken unvermindert Energiepreise weiter erheblich unter Vorjahresniveau
EZB verschärft Regeln für ABS
Japanische Regierung ruft offiziell die Deflation aus Streit mit Bank von Japan über notwendige Gegenmaßnahmen
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a  ‘hard-wired’  response  to  warnings 
of systemic risks. One way to achieve 
this  would  be  to  confer  on  the  ESRB 
the  necessary  authority  –  this  would 
require  extensive  legal  adjustments, 
similar to those that will be necessary 
in  the  course  of  a  Europeanization  of 
banking supervision.   
Two  conclusions  can  be  drawn  with 
respect  to  a  future  early  containment 
of  systemic  risks.  On  the  one  hand, 
the  qualified,  organizational  and  legal 
conditions must be created that would 
allow  a  risk  map  to  be  drawn  up  in 
the  first  place.  If,  in  addition  to  this, 
a  systemic  stabilization  effect  is  to  be 
realized then it will require the political 
will  to  allow  an  independent  body  to 
enforce appropriate measures concerning 
systemically relevant institutions – a clear 
departure from the position of national 
sovereignty  hitherto  pursued  in  issues 
relating to banking supervision.  
Whilst  the  first  challenge  has  already 
been taken up and initial signs of progress 
can be detected, when it comes to the 
second challenge not only is there still 
a lack of feasible concepts but also and 
above  all  a  lack  of  the  corresponding 
political will.  
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CFS talks to Eugen Paravicini about Frankfurt as financial center 
Frankfurt is Germany’s leading financial 
center. Many key players of the financial 
sector are located here. Frankfurt also 
plays  an  important  role  regarding  the 
economic power and the creation and 
preservation  of  jobs  in  the  state  of 
Hesse. How would you rate conditions 
in  Frankfurt  as  a  location?  And  what 
might the federal state government do 
to support and improve these conditions 
in Frankfurt in the future? 
In my view the conditions in Frankfurt 
as a financial center are excellent. It is 
not merely a coincidence that Germany’s 
most important financial players as well 
as the European Central Bank and the 
Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational  Pensions  Supervisors 
(CEIOPS)  are  all  located  here.  This 
concentration of key players, developed 
over  time,  has  made  the  location 
increasingly attractive to other financial 
services  providers,  and  to  regulatory 
and  monetary  authorities.  In  order  to 
maintain this high standing in the future, 
however,  the  current  infrastructure 
must be constantly updated to keep pace 
with  an  ever-changing  environment. 
Financial  institutions,  their  products 
and  the  markets  are  all  subject  to 
unrelenting  change.  In  the  ongoing 
competition between financial centers, 
the ability to innovate on the basis of an 
excellent intellectual infrastructure plays 
a crucial role. Continuing support for 
Frankfurt’s financial sector is a declared 
goal  of  the  federal  state  government. 
The  government  regards  itself  as 
both  an  initiator  and  a  companion  of 
important developments at the financial 
center, which in our opinion has to be 
greater than the sum of its individual 
parts. Through its regular contact with 
representatives  of  the  financial  sector, 
the federal state government advocates 
a  common  approach  to  supporting 
Frankfurt  as  a  financial  center  and 
developing  long-term  strategies  for 
its  expansion.  The  state  government 
within  the  scope  of  its  own  sphere 
of responsibility focuses on optimizing 
the  intellectual  infrastructure,  the 
transportation  network,  and  the 
legislative  framework,  which  all  play 
a vital role for the competitiveness of 
Frankfurt as a financial center.   
In the face of international competition, 
Frankfurt needs to adopt a clear stance 
vis-à-vis  its  competitors.  Frankfurt 
Main Finance is making an important 
contribution  to  marketing  and 
coordinating  initiatives  aimed  at 
promoting  Frankfurt.  You  have  been 
involved since the beginning. Can you 
tell us more about the achievements and 
objectives of this initiative?   
The main objective of the federal state 
government’s financial market initiatives 
was and is the clear positioning of the 
location and the pursuit of a coordinated 
strategy  with  respect,  for  example, 
to  marketing  and  the  orchestration 
of  other  activities.  Frankfurt  Main 
Finance  was  actually  initiated  by  the 
state  government.  We  have  been 
successful within this set up in bringing 
together the most important institutes 
and  organizations  and  focusing  them 
towards  common  goals.  The  financial 
industry,  the  City  of  Frankfurt  and 
the  State  of  Hesse  founded  Frankfurt 
Main  Finance  in  July  2008  in  order 
to  give  Frankfurt’s  financial  sector  a 
voice with which it could make known 
its potential and appeal both nationally 
and  internationally  and  in  order  to 
strengthen,  by  means  of  a  common 
identity,  the  commitment  to  the 
location  and  its  further  development.
Now that Main Finance is in its second 
year  of  existence,  we  can  look  back 
on a successful first round of activity. 
The  structure  of  a  more  long-term 
oriented  strategy  is  evident,  and  the 
initiative  has  gained  acceptance  and 
is  well  established.  A  concept  for  the 
organization of IT-based communication 
and  information  access  stands  ready.
To  be  sure,  much  remains  to  be 
done  in  order  to  secure  an  even 
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firmer  anchorage  within  the  financial 
community  and  to  provide  a  sharper 
outline to the strategic orientation. But 
the  necessity  for  cooperation  between 
institutes  and  across  the  community’s 
sectors has been acknowledged. 
Frankfurt  as  a  financial  center  finally 
has a common platform from which to 
promote and improve its profile. 
In your opinion which strategies should 
now be adopted in order to help Frank-
furt  acquire  greater  public  visibility?     
   
The  most  obvious  instrument  for 
achieving this objective is undoubtedly 
Frankfurt Main Finance. The financial 
community is indeed by the nature of its 
services directly related to the institutes 
involved, moreover its presence is felt by 
everyone on a daily basis and is reported 
upon by the media. For us as a federal 
state it has been important to eliminate 
deficits  in  the  perception  of  being  a 
community  and  an  economic  cluster. 
In  our  view  it  has  been  important 
to  give  precedence  in  this  context 
to  introducing  a  single  trademark,  a 
common  marketing  strategy  and 
prescribed terminology when discussing 
important issues regarding the financial 
center. And we should not stop here. 
Marketing  requires  content  as  well 
as  positions.  It  is  obvious  that  shared 
positions,  given  the  different  interests 
of  those  involved,  are  unrealistic  at 
the detailed level. However, this does 
not  preclude  common  ground  with 
respect  to  fundamental  issues  being 
found  and  communicated  should 
it  be  important  to  the  future  of  the 
financial  center.  The  current  debates 
about  the  necessary  consequences 
for  regulation  and  supervision  to  be 
taken in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis provide a topical example. 
The Frankfurt Main Finance initiative 
also  promotes  the  academic  or  intel-
lectual infrastructure here in Frankfurt. 
The  House  of  Finance,  for  example, 
is  a  sponsoring  member  of  the 
initiative. Applied research and training 
constitute  a  substantial  part  of  the 
activities within the House of Finance. 
How do you evaluate this? And to what 
extent is this an asset to Frankfurt? 
It  is  well  known  that  the  House  of 
Finance  was  established  with  con-
siderable  financial  support  from  the 
State  of  Hesse.  The  underlying  vision 
was  to  bring  together  outstanding 
competence and recognized excellence 
in  research  and  teaching  in  the  field 
of  finance  by  combining  expertise  in 
the  disciplines  of  economics,  finance 
and  law  under  one  roof.  Individual 
well-established  and  internationally 
oriented institutes have come together 
in  the  House  of  Finance  to  form  an 
institution unique even by international 
standards. Bearing in mind the seminal 
importance of its research and practice-
oriented teaching for the development 
of  a  globally  competitive  financial 
services sector, the significance of such 
an  institution  cannot  be  emphasized 
enough. The Hessian state government 
is  convinced  that  the  interdisciplinary 
work at the House of Finance will, in 
the  medium  term,  elevate  academic 
research in Frankfurt once and for all 
to the top of the international ranks in 
the field of financial research. 
Of  course,  the  optimal  governance 
and  internal  coordination  of  such  a
sophisticated  complex  will  still  raise 
many questions.  
However, the planned Policy Platform 
will  already  satisfy  a  basic  objective 
by  ensuring  the  transfer  of  results  to 
the  arena  of  public  debate  on  issues 
such  as  supervision,  regulation  and 
will  in  general  secure  the  application 
of these results in Germany. 
Through  the  financial  support  of  the 
state  government  for  the  House  of 
Finance as well as the support for the 
applied  sciences  universities,  we  have 
provided a considerable impetus for new 
developments. The financial support of 
the  state  in  helping  to  establish  the 
Frankfurt Institute for Risk Management 
and  Regulation  as  well  as  a  funded 
Chair for Insurance Management are the 
latest steps for promoting research and 
teaching in the field of finance. 
Using the Financial Center Index, CFS 
carries  out  quarterly  surveys  among 
key  players  from  the  various  financial 
centers  in  Germany  regarding  their 
assessments  and  expectations.  The 
index  also  measures  current  business 
sentiment  regarding  development 
opportunities  and  the  risks  facing  the 
financial  center,  and  observes  changes 
over  time.  In  addition  special  surveys 
on current themes are conducted. What 
insights  does  the  state  government 
hope to gain from this project? 
When in 2002/2003 a comprehensive 
financial center initiative of the federal 
state was drawn up, we had already begun 
at an early date to discuss with CFS and 
the  Frankfurt  School  of  Finance  and 
Management the ongoing monitoring as 
well as the measurement and evaluation 
of the financial center’s performance. 
Well-designed purpose-built indicators 
promised  a  sound  database  for 
quantifying  the  state  of  the  financial 
services  industry  and  the  economic 
cluster that defines the financial center 
and also – and from our point of view 
this  was  very  important  –  provided 
the basis on which administrative and 
political  decisions  could  be  made. 
Now  that  the  business  sentiment 
indicator of the CFS has been calculated 
for some length of time and is published 
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in  cooperation  with  Frankfurt  Main 
Finance, we are pleased to witness how 
lively  public  interest  in  this  indicator 
and the special surveys has become. In 
addition, we are also expecting valuable 
insights from the financial market data 
collection  of  the  Frankfurt  School. 
In future it will be possible to access 
this  database  via  the  internet  portal 
of Frankfurt Main Finance. 
 
The  CFS  Financial  Center  Index 
indicated a turnaround from July 2009 
onwards. Is this a sign that Frankfurt, 
despite the financial crisis, has been able 
to maintain its high standing? 
The  trend  of  the  business  sentiment 
index has indeed brought to light and 
quantifiably  confirmed  what  some 
pointers aside from bank balance sheets 
have  indirectly  shown  or  led  us  to 
believe, i.e. that Frankfurt to date has 
been  affected  to  a  lesser  degree  than 
other financial centers by the financial 
crisis. I think it is crucial that it is in fact 
the personal evaluation of the managers 
questioned  when  compiling  the  index 
that has led to such a clear result. 
Of course it is true that the financial 
center as such is an extremely complex 
construction,  especially  in  Frankfurt 
where a greater variety of institutions 
are  to  be  found  than  elsewhere.  It  is 
also  certain  that  the  crisis  has  still 
not been completely overcome so that 
any concluding judgment would appear 
to be premature. 
Even  if  the  necessary  measures, 
including  those  relating  to  regulation 
and  supervision  are  far  from  being 
fully  implemented,  the  trend  of  the 
index  gives  cause  for  optimism.  At 
least  the  structure  and  profile  of  the 
German  banking  system  have,  in  our 
opinion,  generally  proved  themselves. 
Institutes  with  sound  business  models 
focused on safety and stability have been 
affected by the crisis to a lesser degree.
The Q3 2009 survey asked participants 
about  their  views  on  the  regulation 
of  the  global  financial  system.  Nearly 
three  quarters  of  those  surveyed 
supported  the  decision  in  favor  of  a 
European  System  of  Financial  Super-
visors (ESFS), even though this would 
mean  conceding  national  competences 
in  supervision.  Which  (longer  term) 
effects  do  you  anticipate  for  the 
German financial industry? 
We  are  currently  in  the  process  of 
coming  to  terms  with  the  regulatory 
aspects  of  the  financial  crisis,  and  in 
this context we will be presenting our 
proposal  for  an  appropriate  form  of 
regulation and supervision both before 
the  Bundesrat  as  well  as  in  direct 
discussions  with  the  German  govern-
ment  and  the  European  Commission. 
Stability, integrity and sustainability are 
indispensable for restoring faith in the 
markets and for averting the danger of 
systemic  crises.  We  cannot  afford  to 
return to business as usual. Regulatory 
arbitrage  must  be  excluded  by  means 
of internationally valid standards. The 
European  Commission  has  developed 
an ambitious concept for the European-
wide  supervision  of  financial  markets 
together with the necessary supervisory 
structure and is currently working on 
the  necessary  amendments  to  aspects 
such  as  the  regulation  of  coordinated 
bank  rescue  plans  and  an  emergency 
winding  up  process  that  burdens  the 
public budget to the least degree. That 
those  surveyed  by  the  CFS  Financial 
Center  Index  are  in  favor  of  these 
suggestions is nothing less than a pledge 
to  uphold  the  integrity  and  stability 
of  the  financial  markets.  This  result 
reinforces the image that the financial 
center is focusing on the basic tenets of 
stability and integrity in order to provide 
fair  and  sustainable  financial  services. 
The  current  debate  in  Germany, 
however,  also  exhibits  tendencies  in 
the opposite direction. For this reason 
it  will  be  important  to  translate  into 
action  quickly  and  effectively  the 
international  consensus,  which  is 
already starting to crumble, on stricter 
regulation  for  financial  institutions, 
markets and products on a global basis. 
We  expect  that  Frankfurt  will 
gain  considerable  prestige  as  the 
European  decisions  concerning  a 
modified  archi-tecture  for  financial 
supervision  are  put  into  practice. 
This  holds  true  with  respect  to  the 
establishing  of  the  European  Systemic 
Risk  Board  as  much  as  it  does  with 
respect to the location of the European 
insurance supervisory authority. 
The setting up of the European Systemic 
Risk Board as an early warning system 
for systemic risks is an important element 
within the future system of supervisory 
structures.  We  believe  close  linkages 
with the ECB to be a fundamental pre-
requisite  for  the  effectiveness  of  the 
new structures. Likewise improvements 
in the supervision of institutions with 
cross-border activities will depend on the 
close network of financial supervisory 
authorities, derived by transforming the 
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level three committees into authorities 
with specific duties and responsibilities.
The  planned  system  of  an  integrated 
but  decentralized  network  of  super-
visory  authorities,  combined  with 
specific powers endowed by the Euro-
pean  authorities  is  in  my  view  the 
smallest  possible  step  that  can 
engender  a  qualitative  improvement. 
The  willingness  of  member  states  to 
relinquish national competences should 
not be overstretched. Details regarding, 
for example, the distribution of burdens 
and the extent of competences of the 
new  European  authorities  and  the 
binding power of their decisions are still 
to be discussed at length in the course of 
the legislative procedure. Nevertheless, 
the attempt to create an effective system 
for  monitoring  institutes  with  cross 
border business operations is a step in 
the  right  direction.  I  assume  that  the 
proposals  of  the  Commission  in  the 
context  of  the  announced  legislative 
act will be developed in such a way that 
questions  relating  to  the  transference 
of competence, the necessary national 
autonomy and the potential burdening 
of national households will be resolved 
in a satisfactory manner. 
CFS White Paper III
Why a Common 
Eurozone Bond Isn’t Such 
a Good Idea©
As  the  financial  crisis 
was deepening in early 
2009,  the  spreads 
of  the  government 
bonds  of  different 
EMU  countries 
were  widening 
and  the  idea  of  a 
common eurozone 
bond  was  finding  more 
and  more  support.  In  an  article  that 
originally appeared in the Summer 2009 
issue of Europe’s World, Otmar Issing 
argues  against  this  idea.  According 
to  Issing,  a  common  bond  would 
give  the  wrong  signal  by  punishing 
the  fiscally  more  solid  countries  and 
encouraging the “weaker” countries to 
continue on their wrong fiscal course. 
As  a  consequence,  the  credibility  of 
the eurozone und thus the confidence 
of  its  citizens  would  be  undermined. 
He  concludes  that  “solidarity”  in  the 
true sense, meaning that all countries 
observe  the  rules  of  the  Stability  and 
Growth  Pact,  is  needed.  The  article 
can  be  found  on  our  website  www.
ifk-cfs.de  and  on  the  Europe’s  World 
website www.europesworld.org. 
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CFS Colloquium Redefining Accountabilities:
Lessons from the Recent Financial Crisis
Should Monetary Policy “Lean or Clean”? 
27 May 2009 
William White
William White, former Economic Adviser and Head of the Monetary and Economic Department of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), gave a speech entitled “Should Monetary Policy ‘Lean or Clean’?” 
as part of the CFS Colloquium Series. White’s lecture on this new paradigm for monetary policy and his 
recommendation for a new macrofinancial framework are summarized in the following article. 
White  began  his  speech  with  a  short  discourse  on  the 
terminology of the lecture’s subject. He explained that the 
notion  of  monetary  policy  “leaning  against”  expansionary 
phases of credit upturns means it becomes more restrictive 
than inflation forecasts indicate to prevent the build-up of 
asset  bubbles,  whereas  “cleaning  up”  refers  to  a  monetary 
approach  that  is  satisfied  with  providing  huge  amounts  of 
liquidity, once an economic bubble has burst. He stated that 
the question asked in the title of the presentation can only be 
answered by evaluating the relative merits of both approaches, 
in particular with a view to preventing a financial or economic 
crisis like the one currently seen.
White  then  analyzed  the  developments  that  had  led  to  the 
current financial crisis. Since liberalized financial systems seem 
to be inherently procyclical, the world has witnessed many 
boom-bust  cycles  over  the  course  of  history.  Furthermore, 
there is much evidence that the current crisis fits the same 
pattern as previous crises going back until the great recession 
of  1825.  In  particular,  the  Great  Moderation,  a  phase  that 
started in the mid eighties of the previous century and that 
was characterized by declining volatility in major economic 
parameters, eventually led to several excesses that collapsed 
around the year 2000. The following strong monetary easing 
and historically low short-term and long-term global interest 
rates  led  to  a  strong  rise  in  borrowing  through  declining 
lending  standards  and  cheaply  available  money.  Growth 
remained relatively high until 2008, and positive supply shocks 
kept  inflation  under  control.  However,  during  this  period, 
global imbalances started to grow ever larger, in particular 
with regard to savings rates and trade deficits in some countries 
and investment rates in others. At a certain point in time, 
triggered by the subprime crisis in the U.S., the imbalances 
began to unwind and almost resulted in a meltdown of the 
global financial system and an economic slump. 
Having thus identified a crucial role of monetary policy in the 
development of the crisis, White went on to ask which role 
monetary policy ought to play in moderating the cost of future 
boom-bust cycles. In this context he outlined the main aspects 
of the “lean versus clean” debate. Until recently, said White, 
the dominant analytical paradigm for the conduct of monetary 
policy held “that it is impossible to lean against credit bubbles 
using tighter monetary policy, but that it is possible to clean up 
afterwards using easier monetary policy”. While some central 
banks such as the Bank of Japan and the European Central 
Bank do not follow this course and tend to some extent to 
take  explicitly  into  account  the  building  up,  for  example, 
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of  credit  excesses  in  their  monetary  policy  framework,  a 
majority of central banks – with the most obvious proponent 
being the Federal Reserve – conduct their monetary policy in 
accordance with this approach.
White  then  summarized  the  arguments  supporting  the 
view  that  monetary  policy  cannot  be  used  to  lean  against 
expansionary phases of the credit cycle. First of all, according 
to these arguments, it is hard to choose an appropriate asset 
price  to  target  for  the  process  of  identifying  bubbles.  In 
addition to this – even if such a unique asset price indicator 
were to exist – it would still be difficult to determine whether 
it would result in a bubble or not. Finally, targeting asset 
prices might clash with the goal of price stability in general.
White  next  outlined  the  arguments  opposing  this  view, 
in particular that leaning against the credit cycle does not 
imply  targeting  a  single  asset  price,  but  rather  it  means 
supervising  “combinations  of  rapid  increases  in  monetary 
and  credit  aggregates,  increases  in  a  wide  range  of  asset 
prices, and deviations in spending patterns from traditional 
norms”. Furthermore, conflicts between leaning against the 
credit cycle policies and inflation targets, in particular the 
undershooting of desired inflation, “would not seem to be a 
problem if the economy is still growing strongly under the 
influence of the credit cycle itself”. He then went on to say 
that credible commitments by monetary policymakers might 
even  change  private  investors’  behavior  and  mitigate  some 
of  the  excesses  seen  in  the  current  crisis.  Finally,  tighter 
monetary policy in the upswing would lessen the extent of 
downswings and thus avoid hitting the zero lower bound of 
interest rates.
Next, White summarized the arguments, first, in favor and, 
second, against the view that monetary policy can be effectively 
used to “clean up” in contractionary phases of the credit cycle. 
The arguments in favor of this view consist largely of the general 
support for the view found in the macroeconomic Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models that are used 
by most central banks. Furthermore, this policy seems to have 
worked well in the past and any big downturns that occurred 
were considered to be due to policy errors simply because 
the mopping up approach was not always pursued vigorously 
enough. Finally, proponents of the “cleaning-up-afterwards” 
scenario stress that monetary policy is still effective at the 
zero lower bound. Arguments opposing this approach, said 
White, consist mainly of refuting the previous arguments on 
the grounds that models might be seriously flawed and will 
therefore not adequately represent reality. In addition, it is 
not clear whether policy approaches that have worked in the 
past will necessarily work under future circumstances, and, 
since  severe  recessions  occurring  in  the  past,  which  were 
supposedly  aggravated  by  monetary  policy  mistakes,  can 
only be analyzed using model-based counterfactual analysis, 
these arguments rely exclusively on assumptions. In White’s 
opinion, severe past downturns can also be explained by the 
unwinding  of  economic  imbalances  that  had  built  up  over 
time. He finally stressed that all traditional monetary policy 
channels do not work effectively at the zero lower bound and 
that unorthodox quantitative easing approaches still have to 
pass the test of the current crisis.
White  next  turned  to  analyzing  whether  there  are  other 
policies that can be used to clean up after a bubble has burst. 
One possible option would be to resort to fiscal stimulus. 
However, given the high levels of debt in many countries, even 
fiscal stimulus has “its limitations and longer term dangers”. 
Another remedy would be to just write off all debts that cannot 
be serviced in an orderly way. In the context of the current 
financial crisis, however, this is very difficult since “literally 
millions  of  households  whose  debts  will  not  be  serviced 
under the initially agreed conditions” have been repackaged in 
several credit cascades through structured financial products 
such as mortgage-backed securities. In comparison to these 
remedies,  simply  restoring  the  normal  functioning  of  the 
financial system, through for example recapitalization, setting 
up bad banks and temporary nationalizations, seems to be the 
better alternative. Finally, White emphasized that the crisis 
should  also  be  seen  as  an  opportunity  for  setting  in  place 
resource re-allocations and making markets, in particular the 
labor market, more flexible.
Given the unprecedented policy measures that had to be used 
in the current crisis and taking into account their undesirable 
side  effects  over  the  medium  term,  White  stressed  the 
need  for  a  new  macrofinancial  framework  to  resist  future 
procyclicality. He argued that such a macrofinancial framework 
should have three central characteristics: first of all, it should 
pay increased attention to systemic exposures, that is, take 
consideration of the 
fact  that  different 
agents  have  similar 
exposures  and  re-
actions  to  common 
shocks. A second characteristic would be a symmetric reaction 
of  monetary  policy  to  dealing  with  bubbles,  that  is,  “pre-
emptive  tightening”  would,  to  some  extent,  replace  “pre-
emptive  easing”.  Thirdly,  it  would  be  important  that  “the 
  The paper and the presentation    
  are available on the CFS homepage   
  www.ifk-cfs.de12
Events | CFS Colloquium
authorities  involved  [are]  much  more  mutually  supportive 
than they appear to be at the moment” – on a national as well 
as on an international level. 
White  then  concluded  with  three  points  he  deemed  to 
be  of  particular  importance.  Firstly,  internationally  active 
financial institutions need to be internationally supervised, 
secondly,  recognition  must  be  given  to  the  ever  growing 
role  of  international  economic  and  financial  linkages  that 
contribute to the effects of contagion and the fostering of 
global imbalances, and, thirdly, much more attention needs to 
be paid to the effects of exchange rates on global procyclicality 
since fixed exchange rates play a role in supporting economic 
imbalances. For these reasons, said White, it is necessary to 
rethink the international monetary system.
Marcel Bluhm (CFS)
Management der Finanzmarktkrise aus der Sicht eines CFO
Managing the Financial Crisis from a CFO’s Perspective
9 September 2009 
Eric Strutz
Whereas previous speakers within the series had looked at financial institutions during the crisis from an 
external perspective, Eric Strutz, Chief Financial Officer of Commerzbank AG, now presented the “inside 
view”.
In his introductory remarks, Jan 
Krahnen  welcomed  Eric  Strutz 
and  acknowledged  that  learning 
more about the “inside view” can 
only improve our understanding 
of  the  crisis  and  contribute 
toward preventing similar crises 
in the future.
Strutz  first  recapitulated  the 
financial crisis that started in the 
first quarter of 2007. According 
to  him,  the  subprime  exposure  of  Commerzbank  was  not 
perceived as an imminent threat at the time when the first 
information about write downs on subprime portfolios started 
to filter through. A major turning point was reached on 8 
August 2007, when an excessive demand for liquidity from 
European  financial  institutions  became  known.  After  that 
date, serious doubts about the robustness of the originate-
to-distribute  model  arose  and  finally  became  real  when 
certain areas of the investment banking sector were seriously 
disrupted and collapsed.
Analyzing the underlying causes of the crisis, Strutz pointed 
out that the high degree of liquidity in the market before the 
financial crisis had initiated a fight for assets among investors 
which had decreased the quality of market participants’ risk 
assessments.  Rating  agencies  had  accelerated  this  process 
as their services had been the main assessment tool for the 
quality of structured products by investors. Strutz therefore 
questioned  the  view,  often  voiced  by  rating  agencies,  that 
rating agencies only give an opinion. This bears witness, he 
said, to a lack of commitment, in addition to the observed lack 
of reliability. He further pointed out that a number of market 
participants, in particular monolines, had exceeded their risk-
bearing capacities.
Strutz  then  went  on  to  identify  five  key  assumptions  of 
banks’ business models that have come under scrutiny due 
to the financial crisis and that, in his view, need a thorough 
reconsideration. First, he said that markets had not been as 
efficient and liquid as originally thought by market participants. 
He opposed the general view that mistrust was the major 
reason why the interbank market had dried up. In fact it was 
the case that most banks had experienced a sudden and large 
liquidity demand from a number of special purpose vehicles. 
Second,  Strutz  argued  that  the  existing  classifications  of 
structured products must be regarded with scepticism since a 
large number of products were downgraded by three or more 
notches within a short period of time. Third, he mentioned 
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that the implementation of MaRisk1 has not improved the risk 
management of banks automatically. Moreover, he emphasized 
the need for an active exchange of information between front 
office and risk management teams since the financial crisis has 
brought to light weaknesses in the coverage of market risks. 
Fourth, he called for caution when using statistical models 
for assessing financial risks. He pointed out that a number of 
European banks had not purchased complex financial products 
as their risk management systems had not been able to cope 
with  the  complexity  level  of  these  products  and  therefore 
had suffered less than their competitors. His fifth and final 
point was that management of the liability side, in particular 
debt, should have first priority as changes on the asset side are 
particularly costly in crisis times.
Strutz emphasized the need to anticipate major turning points in 
the real economy. One such turning point was the first quarter 
of 2009, when goods on order showed a considerable decrease 
across all industries. It is, however, still uncertain whether the 
bottom of the financial and economic crisis has been reached. 
In his concluding remarks, Strutz named 10 important lessons 
for financial risk managers: 1) when buying financial products, 
careful consideration should be given to pricing differences 
for  the  same  risk;  2)  the  possibility  of  illiquid  markets 
should be taken into account; 3) risk managers should not 
only rely on external ratings but should also look at internal 
assessments; 4) a concentration of risks should be avoided 
and diversification encouraged; 5) banks should strictly apply 
their standards and guidelines across all states of the economy 
when  assessing  financial  risks;  6)  transparency  should  be 
enhanced by institutionalizing all reporting processes; 7) risk 
management should track market developments closely; 8) the 
information exchange between market and risk management 
divisions of a bank should be ensured; 9) banks should ensure 
that quantitative analytical methods and expert knowledge are 
used in a systematic and efficient manner; 10) banks should be 
prepared to set up a task force in case of an upcoming crisis.
David Nicolaus (CFS)
Wege zur Finanzmarktstabilität
Roads to Financial Stability
24 November 2009 
Hugo Bänziger
Hugo Bänziger, Chief Risk Officer and Board Member of Deutsche Bank AG, was the next guest in the 
Colloquium Series on “Redefining Accountability: Lessons from the Recent Financial Crisis”. As Jan Krahnen 
mentioned in his introduction, the keyword of this lecture series is accountability, which is demanded from 
all market players. Bänziger took up this issue and acknowledged the importance of a bank’s accountability. 
Based on his own experience, he said that banks and managers are indeed being held accountable for the 
consequences of the crisis.
Bänziger  said  that  major  shifts 
are  taking  place  and  there  is 
plenty  of  new  information  and 
new proposals being put forward 
in  rapid  succession.  Banks  have 
lost  a  lot  of  equity  capital  and 
the  old  standards  were  shown 
to  have  clearly  been  insufficient 
as  a  buffer.  Bänziger  said  that 
for this reason he considered the 
supervisors’ call for more capital 
both understandable and justified. Deutsche Bank, for example, 
managed the events during the last quarter of 2008 relatively 
well thanks to a capital ratio that was substantially above the 
minimum requirements. The main question, however, is how 
much capital does our system need? Bänziger emphasized that 
there is a trade-off. Equity capital is an expensive refinancing 
tool, the costs of which are borne by the firms and private 
clients on the asset side of the balance sheet. He, therefore, 
emphasized  the  importance  of  thinking  the  whole  matter 
through very carefully. To determine an appropriate level of 
capital is not a straightforward matter. UBS, for example, had 
Hugo Bänziger
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a high core capital ratio but it was still not sufficient during the 
crisis. For this reason, Bänziger said the focus should not be 
solely on the absolute levels of capital. He went on to analyze 
the sequence of events that had happened during 2008. After 
a rather slow start to the crisis, a chain reaction was set in 
motion that eventually spread to the whole financial sector. 
Recently, a lot is being said about systemic risk, but no clear 
definition is at hand. Here, Bänziger made the comparison with 
a viral infection. It is essential to understand the transmission 
mechanisms that cause the contamination. 
Bänziger then identified possible causes of the chain reaction 
and  analyzed  five  potential  areas  for  improvement.  First, 
inter-bank markets need tighter regulation. From the crisis it 
became clear that due to the lack of credit rules and limits, 
many institutions overstretched their commitments. He used 
the  example  of  Hypo  Real  Estate  to  show  the  far-reaching 
impact  of  this  deficiency.  Second,  the  payment  systems  had 
been  neglected  and  were  inadequate  for  the  transmission 
requirements of banks. Clear mechanisms for well-functioning 
payment and settlement channels are thus vital. Third, we need 
to unravel and simplify some of the complexities within the 
derivatives markets. Solutions, such as moving the clearing of 
OTC derivatives to central clearing counterparties, are already 
being pushed through. Fourth, deposit-guarantee schemes in 
Europe are archaic and flawed as a result of national sovereignty 
claims  and  political  resistance.  Bänziger  made  a  comparison 
with  the  U.S.  and  claimed  that  there  is  much  room  for  a 
Europe-wide improvement. Fifth, the insolvency laws need to 
be improved in order to be able to handle bank bankruptcies 
in a timely and effective manner. Bank defaults at the moment 
have a very negative impact on the real economy. There are 
many conceivable solutions for making solvency law for banks 
more effective. 
In his closing remarks, Bänziger emphasized the importance of a 
strong financial infrastructure that is able to prevent shockwaves. 
He pointed out that company failures are an intrinsic part of our 
market system. This is exactly why our society has insolvency 
laws. However, for banks, there is a policy conflict at the highest 
level. This makes a transparent system with clear rules all the 
more important.
After the lecture, there was a lively discussion on many issues 
such as European regulation, the concept of a “bank hospital”, 
accounting  standards  and  guarantee  schemes.  Bänziger  said 
the  answer  lies  in  preventive  action  and  proper  regulation, 
and a crisis fund for banks must be a last resort or emergency 
solution.  In  particular,  the  complex  interconnectedness  of 
market players should be brought under control. All markets 
need proper regulation in order to warrant the mutual trust of 
its participants. When asked about the issue of a systemic risk 
charge, Bänziger replied that he considered such intervention 
and  the  role  played  by  the  Financial  Stability  Board  to  be 
justified. He added, however, that the instruments of financial 
surveillance should be fine-tuned.                    Lut De Moor (CFS)
Do we need more regulation?
10 December 2009 
Eddy Wymeersch
The last event in this year’s colloquium series took place on 10 December with a lecture by Eddy Wymeersch, 
Chairman of the Committee on European Securities Regulators (CESR). 
His introductory remark was that the question in the title 
of his speech “Do we need more regulation?” has become 
obsolete over the last year because more regulation is now 
effectively in place or is being prepared. As a consequence 
of the crisis, parts of the markets are being reregulated. He 
listed  the  topics  on  the  agenda  for  markets  and  securities 
regulation. Looking at the different areas in more detail, he 
made the distinction between regulation as “rule making” and 
regulatory supervision.
The first issue on the agenda is the regulation of credit rating 
agencies. According to Wymeersch, they have not performed 
well before and during the crisis. The fees that were received 
by  credit  agencies  had  risen  dramatically  in  the  period 
2005-2008, mainly due to their activities in the market of 
structured products. One of the big weaknesses of the system 
was that the agencies were not only rating the products but 
also advising the issuers, leading to a clear conflict of interest. 
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was flawed as they only used statistical methods to look at the 
behavior of products and never took a profound look at the 
substance of the products. In the future, the new regulation 
for  credit  rating  agencies  will  introduce  obligations  for 
registration, rules on conflicts of interest and on procedures 
and more transparency through disclosure. Wymeersch said 
that there should be no room for “second guessing” on ratings 
and that international coordination is of great importance. The 
supervision and rulemaking will be directly exercised by the 
new European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
The second issue on the agenda is the regulation of hedge funds. 
The proposed directive that is currently under discussion is 
very  controversial.  To  Wymeersch,  the  initial  proposal  by 
the commission was not very balanced. Important is to define 
first why hedge funds need to be regulated. In his view, it is 
not obvious that hedge funds have contributed to the crisis. 
The issues at stake are the systemic risk they can pose, and the 
possibility of market abuse due to insider trading. In addition 
there  is  a  need  for  investor  protection  if  hedge  funds  are 
distributing their products to the public at large. One of the 
points that is also addressed in the proposal is remuneration. 
The debate is still ongoing and an outcome might be expected 
in the next half year.
The third issue is the regulation of secondary markets. Today, 
a large part of equity trading – by some estimated to be around 
40% - has moved away from the traditional stock exchanges. 
CESR is currently investigating the different types of trading 
and their volumes in order to get a clear picture of the size 
of this new trend. According to Wymeersch, the problems 
caused by this evolution are twofold: the lack of reliable and 
transparent prices is detrimental for investor confidence and 
makes  the  evaluation  basis  of  investment  funds  (based  on 
stock exchange prices) unreliable. In order to adjust to the 
new situation Wymeersch sees a need for more post-trade 
transparency and possibly pre-trade transparency.
The fourth issue concerns the regulation of Packaged Retail 
Investment Products (PRIPs), which are financially equivalent 
to  regulated  products  but  with  a  lower  level  of  investor 
protection requirements. A proposal for regulation by CESR 
is being discussed. It would introduce an equivalent regime 
regarding disclosure in the form of a short prospectus (KID) 
and regarding rules of conduct for these products.
The next issue concerns the systemic risk posed by considerable 
accumulation of exposure in the derivatives markets. Under 
pressure  from  the  central  banks,  transactions  are  now 
centralized and cleared through Central Counterparties. For 
this purpose, contracts need to be standardized which is not 
self-evident, especially not in the market of Credit Default 
Swaps (CDS).
As final point on the agenda, Wymeersch spoke about short 
selling rules. The proposals that have been discussed so far 
were rather chaotic. CESR has now put a proposal on the 
table  for  rules  of  disclosure  and  possibly  on  the  time  till 
settlement.
Wymeersch  then  continued  with  an  overview  of  the  new 
supervisory architecture. He said that the limits of what can 
be reached with the current system – which is based on self-
regulation, cooperation and voluntary regulation - have been 
reached. The new system will be much stronger in its demands 
for coordination. At the ECOFIN meeting on 2 December, a 
regulation for the banking, insurance and securities sectors 
was  set  up.  The  European  Parliament  will  now  propose 
amendments  and  the  legislative  process  is  expected  to  be 
finalized in the first half of 2010. The new authorities, which 
are  built  on  the  existing  structures,  will  then  hopefully 
become operational in 2011, which is a very fast procedure. 
The  de  Larosière  report  stated  that  supervision  cannot  be 
centralized too much if progress is to be made at the European 
level. Day-to-day supervision of banks, investment funds, etc. 
should remain at the local level. What needs to be centralized 
is  rulemaking,  so  that  rules  are  the  same  and  are  applied 
in  the  same  manner  throughout  Europe,  said  Wymeersch. 
The three agencies (ESAs) will operate very independently 
from  the  Commission  and  will  have  a  number  of  “hard 
powers” in rule making, in the consistent application of the 
rules, in emergency matters and in mediating and settling 
disagreements. Some areas of power are still controversial, 
such as the power to act directly against individual firms and 
the power to declare an emergency.
He concluded that the current transition to a new architecture 
is crucial as it means that more regulation is put at the level 
of central decision making. It is now up to the authorities to 
implement the new mandate they got from the European Insti-
tutions.                             Lut De Moor (CFS)
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CFS President Otmar Issing welcomed another prominent guest in Frankfurt for the CFS Presidential Lecture 
Series  on  European  Integration.  Jacques  de  Larosière,  former  Managing  Director  of  the  International 
Monetary Fund and former President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of 
course widely known for his recent work as Chairman of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision 
in the EU – also referred to as the de Larosière Group – spoke before a full audience about the European 
proposals for better financial regulation and supervision.
CFS Presidential Lecture
European Proposals for Better Regulation and 
Supervision in a Global Financial System
17 November 2009 
Jacques de Larosière
He  started  his  lecture  by  reflecting  on  the  causes  of  the 
financial crisis that erupted in 2007 in a manner that has 
so  far  been  beyond  comparison  to  any  other  upheaval  in 
the recent past. In his opinion, an expansionary monetary 
policy, together with massive liquidity and an erosion of risk 
awareness  were  the  factors  that  contributed  in  a  cohesive 
and synchronized manner to the crisis. In addition to this, 
financial innovation was used as an excuse to turn a blind eye 
to common sense. After its break-out in the U.S., the crisis 
spread almost instantaneously to all countries and exacted 
a  high  price  in  terms  of  employment  and  growth.  In  the 
first part of his lecture, de Larosière spoke about the global 
economic imbalances that led to the crisis and how these 
issues  should  be  addressed.  In  the  second  part,  he  talked 
about Europe’s role in a global solution.
Addressing global imbalances
Before the 2007 crisis, comments such as “global imbalances 
are unsustainable but fortunately we have a resilient financial 
system”  were  not  unusual.  For  years,  we  faced  global 
macroeconomic  imbalances  that  also  led  in  2004  to  a 
phenomenon in the U.S. of persistently declining long-term 
interest rates at a time of rising short-term interest rates. 
The explanation for what was referred to as “Greenspan’s 
conundrum” lay in the excess capital inflows from large parts 
of the world that were driving down yields. For a decade, 
ever higher U.S. consumption financed by an ever increasing 
indebtedness kept the situation together. At the same time, 
the  general  awareness  that  the  existing  global  imbalances 
could not last forever was rising.
The  response  today  to  these  macroeconomic  imbalances 
needs to be adequate and well-coordinated, said de Larosière. 
The G-20 Group has in fact launched a new framework for 
sustainable and balanced growth and their last meeting in 
Pittsburgh paved the way for action. De Larosière, however, 
expressed his doubts by saying “if the past is a guide for the 
future, we have reason to be sceptical”. He stressed that the 
“pitfall of wishful thinking” should be avoided and warned 
against a relapse into purely intellectual reflections.
He continued his lecture with his views on the new supervisory 
framework for Europe and the recommendations that were 
made by the High Level Group on Financial Supervision. The 
first part of the new framework concerns the monitoring 
and assessing of macro-economic trends (macro-prudential 
supervision) by the ESRB. This body will have no mandatory 
powers but can issue warnings and give recommendations to 
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governments and regulators. In his opinion, central banks are 
well equipped for this challenge because of their independency 
and their close relation with regulators. The second part of the 
framework is the regulatory reform aimed at strengthening 
financial  institutions.  De  Larosière  identified  some  major 
flaws in the pre-crisis system. He said that the weakness of the 
financial institutions did not lie in an undercapitalization, but 
rather in the fact that in the face of market disruptions many 
institutions were less liquid than they thought. The problem 
was  compounded  by  rising  securitization.  In  addition,  the 
existing Basel rules relied too much on rating agencies and 
internal  risk  models.  These  weaknesses  must  be  met  by 
a  number  of  counter  initiatives,  such  as  increased  capital 
requirements (albeit to a lesser extent for commercial lending), 
anticyclical provisioning, tighter liquidity control, stress tests, 
and transparent accounting rules. De Larosière expressed his 
hope that a harmonized set of rules will be established and 
applied in all countries.
Role of Europe
He stressed that these European proposals are essential, not 
only because they strengthen the regulation and supervision in 
Europe but also because they consolidate Europe’s influence 
in international negotiations. If Europe comes forward with 
a well-designed proposal that has the right balance between 
prudential rules and intermediation, it will potentially have 
more influence on the debate. 
The report presented by the de Larosière Group earlier this 
year entailed 31 recommendations. De Larosière highlighted 
some  of  the  report’s  essential  elements  in  his  speech. 
Firstly,  the  highly  fragmented  national  regulations  should 
be  harmonized  because  the  current  regulatory  patchwork 
hinders  cross  border  activities.  Secondly,  the  proposed 
European  System  of  Financial  Supervisors  (ESFS)  should 
not aim at replacing the national supervisors with a kind of 
supranational body. As bank bail-outs and rescues remain a 
national task, it is self-evident that the day-to-day supervision 
should  remain  at  that  level.  The  ESFS  should  exercise  a 
mediating and coordinating role through three authorities: 
the  European  Banking  Authority  (EBA),  the  European 
Insurance  and  Occupational  Pensions  Authority  (EIOPA) 
and  the  European  Securities  Authority  (ESA).  Thirdly, 
macroeconomic  surveillance  should  be  part  of  the  new 
architecture.
The U.S. currently has a very fragmented supervisory system. 
De Larosière expressed surprise that, given the immensity of 
the crisis, no real proposal for a harmonization of the U.S. 
system exists. Europe should set its stamp on suggestions 
for  a  global  solution  and  try  to  exercise  influence  in  the 
following areas: 1) in the field of systemic risk oversight, 
Europe’s proposal of macro-prudential supervision can serve 
as  a  model  solution;  2)  putting  in  heavy  layers  of  capital 
requirements  should  be  avoided.  Given  that  Europe  has  a 
higher degree of financing through bank intermediation, any 
additional requirement would have a relatively heavier impact 
on growth in Europe; 3) in the accounting debate Europe 
should place emphasis on the observance of the quality of the 
standards; and 4) Europe should stress the importance of a 
uniformed enforcement of the rules, which is as important as 
the definition of the rule itself. 
How could such rules 
be imposed and what 
possible  procedures 
of appeal exist? According to de Larosière, the IMF could 
play a more operational role in this respect, given its capacity 
to send missions to countries to observe.
De  Larosière  concluded  his  speech  by  accentuating  the 
importance of a global reform. In this reform, Europe should 
face up to its responsibilities and since the European system 
has proven to be resilient, demonstrate confidence in exerting 
authority to influence the discussion.             Lut De Moor (CFS)
Helmut Schlesinger
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  The speech is available on the  
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Vikram Pandit, Chief Executive Officer of Citigroup, was the keynote speaker at a lecture jointly organized 
by the Graduate School of Economics, Finance, and Management (GSEFM1) and CFS. His presentation entitled 
“Economic Recovery and the Future of Banking” was addressed to the students of the Graduate School of 
Economics, Finance, and Management and attracted much attention from a wider public. 
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Economic Recovery and the Future of Banking
8 October 2009 
Vikram Pandit
Lecture jointly organized by GSEFM and CFS
After introductory remarks by Vice President Rainer Klump 
(Goethe University), the Dean of GSEFM, Michael Binder 
(Goethe University and CFS), opened with a reminder that 
in light of the painful economic and financial imbalances of 
the recent past, it is imperative that initiatives be undertaken 
to further develop proper governance structures for global 
economic and financial markets. He noted, however, that for 
economic growth it is essential that financial development 
and international financial integration continue to flourish 
within the proper institutional structures. In this context, 
he  welcomed  Vikram  Pandit  as  an  ambassador  of  globally 
oriented innovations for financial market development.
Vikram Pandit began his speech on a positive note, pointing 
out  that  a  degree  of  normality  is  now  returning  to  the 
markets. The world economy seems to be heading towards 
recovery, and the financial markets show positive signs and 
pockets of strength. He cautioned, however, that focusing on 
a positive future also requires a proper understanding of the 
past and the reasons why the crisis occurred.
The  great  imbalances  in  the  world,  and  especially  in  the 
U.S.,  were  key  factors  in  the  crisis.  To  name  just  a  few, 
the  world  is  facing  imbalances  in  the  housing  market,  in 
terms of trade deficits and budget deficits, and in the form 
of unemployment. We are now in the middle of the largest 
rebalancing act within the last 100 years, and we can expect 
this rebalancing cycle to go on for a long time. One of the 
biggest tasks is the rebalancing of growth. For a long period 
in the past, there were two major drivers of growth: U.S. 
consumption and credit creation. It is, however, very unlikely 
that either of these will be able to take on this role in the 
future. New sources of growth are to be found, such as the 
consumption in emerging market economies. This will lead 
1 This lecture was also GSEFM’s inaugural ‘Global Economic and Financial Policy Series’ lecture19
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to a new economic reality, 
reflected  in  a  stronger 
reliance on emerging market 
growth, lower growth rates 
in  the  western  developed 
countries,  readjustments  in 
the exchange rates and also 
in  the  economic  power  of 
individual countries.
As  a  second  issue,  Pandit 
addressed  the  reshaping  of 
the  financial  architecture. 
“We have been riding on a 
high-speed train...but on rails laid more than sixty years ago”, 
he said, referring to the lack of a genuine global architecture. 
In the past, we saw the creation of a shadow banking system 
with  little  or  no  regulation  and  no  deposit  base  for  its 
lending activities. This sector could thrive on the arbitrage 
of regulation, and was responsible for half the credit creation 
in the U.S. Its collapse, however, has spurred two changes: 
a regulatory change and a change in the funding markets. 
Pandit emphasized that regulatory changes are an advantage 
as they create a “level playing field”. He specified several 
steps towards a new form of regulation, such as regulating 
transparency and introducing a more clear-cut system with 
systemic  regulators  who  aggregate  information  and  raise 
transparency. Changes in the funding market will lead to 
a greater reliance on deposits for credit growth and this in 
turn will lead to a restructuring of the financial industry and 
financial institutions.
Finally, Pandit spoke about a new level of global cooperation. 
He attached great importance to the need for open trade 
and capital, with a sound underlying regulatory base. “This 
is not the time to put up barriers”, he said. As the current 
imbalances will continue for a while, it is more than necessary 
to be able to rely on each other. 
After the lecture, Pandit answered student questions. When 
asked about the role of the government and regulation, he 
spoke  about  the  experience  of  Citigroup  with  the  capital 
support from the government. Pandit explained that the bank 
has a constructive relationship with its regulators and that 
the U.S. government does not intend to operate the bank or 
participate in its strategy. The objective is to lend a “helping 
hand to the invisible hand”, said Pandit. 
The lecture was followed by the scholarship awards of the “Citi 
Foundation Frankfurt Scholars in Economics and Finance” 
bestowed upon a selected group of graduate students with a 
migrant and economically disadvantaged background, as well 
as the requisite strong quantitative and analytical skills.
Vikram Pandit
The Graduate School of 
Economics, Finance, and 
Management  (GSEFM) 
– based in the House of 
Finance  –  constitutes 
an  alliance  between  Goethe  University  Frankfurt, 
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, and Technical 
University  Darmstadt.  Operating  in  continental 
Europe’s  primary  center  for  financial  markets  and 
central  banking,  GSEFM  aims  to  realize  the  three 
universities’  joint  vision  to  establish  a  premier 
European  center  for  quantitative  and  research-
oriented  graduate-level  education  in  economics, 
finance, and management. www.gsefm.eu
Vikram Pandit, Rainer Klump, Michael Binder20
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A Solution for Europe’s Banking Problem
15 July 2009 
Nicolas Véron
During the summer, CFS organized a lunchtime seminar with Nicolas Véron (Research Fellow at Bruegel), 
who spoke about solutions for continental Europe’s banking system. Véron’s lecture was based on a joint 
article  with  Adam  Posen,  entitled  “A  Solution  for  Europe’s  Banking  Problem”,  which  appeared  in  the 
Bruegel Policy Brief Series.
 
In this article, Véron states that Europe is very reliant on 
bank credit and bank intermediation of savings. The state of 
continental Europe’s banking industry remains very fragile. 
Many European banks cannot be considered any more robust 
now  than  they  were  in  late  2008.  Moreover,  healing  the 
banking  system  has  become  vital  to  securing  a  sustained 
recovery of the economy.
In order to counter a potentially rising number of insolvent 
banks, Véron sees a need for a joint European approach to 
the problem. According to Véron, systemic bank crises are 
not self-solving but policymakers are reluctant to take tough 
measures. In order to differentiate among banks, he proposes 
implementing  a  centralized  “triage”  process  that  would 
assess the solidity and long-term viability of key banks on a 
comparative basis. He refers to other major banking crises in 
developed economies in which a form of triage had eventually 
been used to overcome the banks’ problems. 
Because  banking  supervision  is  primarily  national,  Véron 
acknowledges that there would be opposition to a centralized 
Europe-wide system of stress testing. He gives two reasons 
why  tackling  the  problem 
cross-nationally  is  the  best 
way  to  proceed.  First,  only 
by introducing a conform and 
harmonized  assessment  can 
trust be restored. National authorities would otherwise tend 
to be too lenient towards “their” banks, and a supervisory 
race to the bottom could ensue. Second, the risk landscape 
has  changed  profoundly  due  to  financial  and  banking 
integration.  Therefore,  the  increased  risk  of  cross-border 
bank insolvencies requires a supranational approach.
Véron proposes the creation of a temporary supranational 
agency,  a  European  banking  “Treuhand”  with  three  well-
defined  tasks:  1)  steering  the  triage  process  through  an 
evaluation  of  the  capital  adequacy  of  major  banks  and 
publishing its outcome, 2) catalyzing the recapitalization and 
brokering  negotiations  among  member  states  to  share  the 
burden of recapitalization, 3) managing assets that fall into 
public ownership as a result of restructurings. This approach 
is of a short-term nature but it would buy time for a broader 
reform of the supervisory architecture and would keep cross-
border banking sustainable in the EU.
Lut De Moor (CFS)
   The Policy Brief 
  can be found on
  www.bruegel.org
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Bundesbank and the ECB. The speakers, particularly economic experts in the area of monetary policy, 
present their current research findings to a selected circle of central bankers and macroeconomists. In the 
second half year of 2009, the organizing institutions have hosted the following economic professionals:
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Joint Lunchtime Seminars
1 Jul 2009  Tax Smoothing in Frictional Labor Markets 
  Sanjay Chugh (University of Maryland)
8 Jul 2009  A Market for Interbank Lemons 
  Tommaso Mancini Griffoli (Swiss National Bank)
15 Jul 2009  The Quality of Political Institutions and the  
  Curse of Natural Resources 
  Ester Hauck (Institut d‘Anàlisi Econòmica)
22 Jul 2009  Potential and Natural Output 
  Giorgio Primiceri (Northwestern University)
12 Aug 2009  Explaining Cross-Country Labor Market  
  Cyclicality: U.S. vs. Germany
  Moritz Kuhn (University of Mannheim)
19 Aug 2009  Contagion and Regulatory Forbearance 
  Lucy White (Harvard Business School)
26 Aug 2009  Securitization Without Risk Transfer 
  Philipp Schnabl (New York University)
2 Sep 2009  News – Good or Bad – and Its Impact on   
  Volatility Predictions Over Multiple Horizons 
  Eric Ghysels (University of North Carolina)
9 Sep 2009  Inattentive Professional Forecasters
  Philippe Andrade (Banque de France)
16 Sep 2009  Persistent Liquidity Effect and Long run  
  Money Demand 
  Francesco Lippi (Università degli Studi di Sassari)
23 Sep 2009  Asset Price Fluctuations, Financial Crises and the
  Stabilizing Effects of a General Transaction Tax 
  Stephan Schulmeister (Austrian Institute of 
  Economic Research)
30 Sep 2009  Sector-Specific Technical Change 
  John Fernald (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco)
7 Oct 2009  Information, Heterogeneity and Market  
  Incompleteness 
  Liam Graham (University College London)
14 Oct 2009  Equilibrium in a Production Model with  
  Limited Commitment 
  Tom Krebs (Universität Mannheim)
21 Oct 2009  Wage Rigidity and Job Creation 
  Christian Haefke (Institute for Advanced Studies)
28 Oct 2009  Capital Misallocation and Aggregate Factor 
  Productivity 
  Costas Azariadis (Washington Universityn in St. Louis)
4 Nov 2009  Household Decisions, Credit Markets and the  
  Macroeconomy: Implications for the Design of  
  Central Bank Models 
  John Muellbauer (Nuffield College, Oxford    
  University)
11 Nov 2009  Corporate Bond Liquidity Before and After  
  the Onset of the Subprime Crisis 
  David Lando (Copenhagen Business School)
18 Nov 2009  Evidence of Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross- 
  Border Mergers of Banks in the EU 
  Santiago Carbó Valverde (Universidad de Granada)
25 Nov 2009 Global Liquidity Trap 
  Ippei Fujiwara (Bank of Japan)
2 Dec 2009  Modelling International Linkages for Large  
  Open Economics: US and Euro Area
  Mardi Dungey (University of Tasmania)
9 Dec 2009  Quantifying the Distortionary Fiscal Cost of‚  
  The Bailout 
  Alex Michaelides (LSE)
16 Dec 2009  Financial Globalization, Financial Crises and  
  Contagion 
  Enrique Mendoza (University of Maryland)
    For further information and registration 
please contact Celia Wieland,    
email: JLS@ifk-cfs.de22
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The ECB and Its Watchers XI 
4 September 2009 
Frankfurt am Main
When ECB officials and watchers met at the conference in September 2007, President Trichet reported that 
liquidity-starved banks had been rushing into the “ECB’s emergency room” to receive immediate aid. One 
year later the ECB had surfaced as one of the most effective central banks in treating its liquidity-hurt 
patients during thirteen months of financial instability. Many ECB watchers, however, attributed its success 
as much to the luck of inheritance of a much broader set of instruments for liquidity-provision as to the 
competence of the “ECB physicians”.
At the ten-year anniversary in 2008, ECB watchers discussed whether the euro area possessed an appropriate 
framework for dealing with the threat of an immediate failure of a large, global and financial player. A 
number of commentators were highly skeptical. Names such as Fortis came 
up. Soon thereafter, these names made headlines. Yet necessary rescues were 
handled surprisingly quickly, apparently helped along by ECB diplomacy.
The second year of the financial crisis brought on the worst recession since World War II. The ECB was forced 
to make use of conventional and unconventional tools. This time, it did not enjoy the luck of inheritance, but 
faced particular challenges in drafting appropriate quantitative and credit easing instruments. 
At this year’s conference participants discussed the ECB’s performance under the threats of a deflationary 
spiral  or  rebounding  inflation  and  reviewed  its  exit  strategy  from  unconventional  policies.  They  also 
debated whether the ECB has appropriate instruments for ensuring monetary and financial stability, and 
explored if euro area governments should help bail out each other to ensure fiscal sustainability.
Since  the  economy  showed  signs  of 
stabilizing, commentators have increas-
ingly  asked  about  “the  ECB’s  exit 
strategy”.  President  Jean-Claude 
Trichet’s  (ECB)  address  on  this 
particular  topic  was  therefore  much 
anticipated. First, Trichet repeated that 
exceptional times demanded exceptional 
actions.  In  the  face  of  the  financial 
crisis,  the  ECB  introduced  a  set  of 
non-standard  measures,  which  they 
called “enhanced credit support”. These 
measures  were  meant  to  help  avoid 
drastic losses of liquidity in the financial 
system and maintain the flow of credit 
to  firms  and  households  beyond  the 
effect of standard policy rate cuts. Yet 
given the fact that these measures are 
exceptional, Trichet stressed that they 
need to be undone once conditions are 
restored back to normal. In this context, 
he  emphasized  that  the  term  ‘exit 
strategy’  should  be  understood  as  the 
framework and set of principles guiding 
the ECB’s approach to unwinding the 
various non-standard measures. It does 
not include considerations about interest 
policy. Moreover, he said that “it would 
be premature to declare the crisis over. 
Now is not the time to exit. But I would 
like to make it clear that the ECB has 
an exit strategy, and we stand ready to 
put it into action when the appropriate 
time comes.”23
CFS Conferences | Events
The  strategy  for  scaling  back  non-
standard  monetary  policy  measures 
relies on the ECB’s reputation for quick 
and crucial action when it is required, 
its technical and institutional ability to 
act, the forward-looking initial design 
of  these  measures,  and  the  link  to 
the  ECB’s  monetary  policy  strategy. 
Ultimately,  it  is  bound  by  the  main 
objective of securing price stability in 
the  euro  area  over  the  medium  and 
longer term. According to Trichet, “the 
exit strategy, in the end, will need to be 
invoked at the precise time in which the 
traditional  link  between  broad  money 
and  our  provision  of  liquidity  to  the 
banking system will re-establish itself.” 
Monetary policy 
in the financial crisis: 
How to deal with the threats 
of a deflationary spiral or 
rebounding inflation?
Jürgen Stark (ECB) started by jesting 
that  President  Trichet  had  left  him 
with  the  “easy”  topic  concerning  the 
exit strategy, namely that of “timing”. 
Indeed  his  presentation  elaborated  on 
Trichet’s remarks by considering how 
the ECB’s monetary policy framework 
would  complement  the  appropriate 
timing  of  the  exit.  With  respect  to 
the  current  outlook,  Stark  signaled 
that  there  are  no  deflationary  risks. 
Both  pillars  in  the  ECB’s  analytical 
framework  indicate  low  inflationary 
pressures. “This is why the Governing 
Council assesses that current rates are 
appropriate  and  why  the  policy  rates 
were left unchanged on September 3.” 
However, this also implies that the time 
to withdraw the exceptional measures 
has not yet arrived.
When it comes to the how and when 
of phasing out non-standard measures, 
Stark  considered  two  possibilities. 
Firstly,  the  problems  in  the  money 
markets  could  disappear  before  price 
stability weakens, which would entail 
that the enhanced credit support would 
need  to  be  removed  before  interest 
rates  are  raised  and  the  removal  of 
the enhanced credit support would not 
have much effect. Alternatively, if the 
risks to price stability become apparent 
while  the  problems  in  the  money 
markets continue, the ECB will have to 
uphold components of the non-standard 
measures, while interest rates would be 
increased to counteract upside swings 
in prices. Stark acknowledged that the 
time  for  exit  had  not  yet  come,  but 
concluded  “I  assure  you  that  we  will 
continue  to  monitor  very  closely  all 
developments  in  the  period  ahead,  in 
order to continue to deliver on our task 
of maintaining price stability over the 
medium term.”
Vincent  Reinhart  (American  Enter-
prise Institute) started by weighing the 
threats  of  a  deflationary  spiral  versus 
rebounding inflation. In such a “balancing 
act”,  central  bankers  have  to  weigh 
the costs to the economy of making a 
mistake  in  either  direction.  In  other 
words, they have to take into account the 
economic outlook as well as structural 
features of the economy concerning the 
determination  of  inflation,  the  extent 
of nominal rigidities and the anchoring 
of  expectations  regarding  inflation 
and  permanent  income.  Costs  are  also 
related  to  the  “therapy”  required  by 
either mistake, in particular whether the 
monetary tools are effective and how long 
it would take to achieve a correction. The 
consequence of a mistake may be that the 
public would start to doubt the central 
bank’s  competence,  investors  would 
become skeptical and politicians would 
raise questions about the central bank’s 
independence.
In  conclusion,  Reinhart  questioned 
prevailing  assessments  regarding  the 
appropriate  balancing  of  deflationary 
and inflationary risks. Although market 
economies are resilient and a rebound is 
visible in the U.S. economy, key finan-
cial  institutions  remain  burdened  by 
unrecognized  losses  on  legacy  assets. 
Concerning the Fed, he noted that pre-
mature investor concerns about its exit 
strategy might force an early exit, while 
the  ECB  would  still  need  to  convince 
the public that it views its inflation goal 
symmetrically.
As  the  third  speaker  in  this  debate, 
Erik  Nielsen  (Goldman  Sachs)  com-
plimented the ECB on its recent per-
formance, but strongly disagreed with 
Jürgen  Stark  who  had  stressed  the 
absence of a risk of deflation. He noted 
that  “if  the  ECB’s  inflation  target  is 
symmetric, its actions and words could 
suggest  otherwise.”  There  appears  to 
Jean-Claude Trichet
Jürgen Stark24
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be  less  concern  when  inflation  under-
shoots  as  suggested  by  Jean-Claude 
Trichet’s comment in August 2009 that 
“inflation rates are projected to remain 
temporarily in negative territory... how-
ever  such  short-term  movements  are 
not  relevant...  looking  further  ahead, 
inflation is expected to remain in positive 
territory.” At the same time, the number 
of forecasters expecting consumer prices 
to  stay  flat  or  fall  has  risen  in  2009, 
meaning the deflation risk is worrisome. 
Regarding  the  exit  strategy,  he  noted 
that in a basic scenario, exit from credit 
support  might  come  spontaneously  as 
well as gradually over the next two to 
three years. One reason being that the 
Taylor  rule  suggests  no  need  to  exit 
anytime  soon.  Moreover,  the  output 
gap, assuming 1.5% trend growth since 
2007, would point to a precipitous fall 
in core inflation. If a masterminded exit 
would be needed, he suggested, gradual 
restrictions on allotment would be the 
way back to competitive auctions. 
Macro-prudential 
supervision: Does the 
ECB have the appropriate 
instruments? Is there a trade-
off between monetary and 
financial stability?
Starting  the  debate  Vice-President 
Lucas Papademos (ECB) emphasized 
that the crisis had shown the importance 
of  protecting  financial  stability  and 
the  significance  of  a  macro-prudential 
approach to regulation and supervision. 
The European Commission proposal of a 
set of bold reforms including the design 
of a new “European Systemic Risk Board” 
(ESRB) is supported by the ECB. The 
formation of such a new framework in 
the EU, has called attention to a number 
of  essential  issues  with  respect  to  its 
objectives, powers and tools. According 
to  Papademos,  there  exist  “important 
questions on how the conduct of macro-
prudential  supervision  relates  to,  and 
complements, the performance of other 
central  banking  tasks  that  can  also 
contribute to financial stability.”
As  to  safeguarding  financial  stability, 
he  stressed  that  the  “ECB’s  monetary 
policy  strategy  is  very  well  suited  for 
the  potential  use  of  the  interest  rate 
instrument in order to ‘lean against the 
wind’ of financial market excesses, in a 
manner consistent with the preservation 
of price stability over the medium and 
long term.” Establishing the ESRB and 
attributing  macro-prudential  tasks  to 
the ECB, will reinforce the ECB’s power 
and  means  to  contribute  to  financial 
stability,  but  without  endangering  its 
monetary  policy  tasks.  Furthermore, 
such  a  macro-prudential  supervisory 
body must be independent in carrying 
out  its  mission.  Papademos  closed  by 
emphasizing  that  “the  ECB  is  actively 
preparing,  in  collaboration  with  the 
national  and  central  banks,  in  order 
to  provide  the  appropriate  analytical 
statistical and administrative support to 
the ESRB.”
Markus  Brunnermeier  (Princeton 
University) highlighted some problems 
with  current  regulation.  The  risk  of 
each bank is treated in isolation. Capital 
requirements  are  pro-cyclical  and  the 
regulation focuses on the asset side of the 
balance sheet. Instead, the focus should 
be on the externalities that contribute to 
systemic  risk.  Brunnermeier  proposed 
particular measures of this contribution 
and drew an analogy to the fire-code 
that  requires  fire-protection  walls  for 
“neighbors”. When banks are forced into 
fire-sales  they  also  depress  prices  for 
other  banks.  Other  externalities  arise 
when banks hoard funds or hide their 
own  commitments,  thereby  creating 
uncertainty for counterparties. 
According to Brunnermeier regulation 
should  be  countercyclical,  that  is  “it 
should  be  strict,  when  the  market  is 
not  strict,  but  less  strict  when  the 
market  is  strict.”  Macro-prudential 
regulation would imply leaning against 
“credit  bubbles”  and  imposing  capital 
requirements and other tax or insurance 
schemes. Brunnermeier emphasized that 
such macro-prudential instruments must 
Lucas Papademos 
Markus Brunnermeier 
Erik Nielsen25
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be independent of political pressure. He 
pointed to potential tradeoffs between 
financial and monetary stability during 
the  build-up  of  credit  bubbles  and 
suggested that this tradeoff provides a 
new rationale for monetary aggregates 
in the policy strategy.
Michael  Dooley  (University  of  Cali-
fornia, Santa Cruz) disagreed with much 
of what had been said by the preceding 
speakers.  In  his  assessment,  the  ideas 
behind  macro-prudential  supervision 
lead down the wrong path in reacting to 
the crisis. Dooley questioned previously-
alleged  impulses  from  the  crisis.  For 
example,  he  noted  that  easy  monetary 
policy  cannot  depress  the  real  interest 
rate  for  years  and  “does  not  have  an 
imaginary twin called liquidity.” Instead, 
he emphasized that leverage is profitable 
at any level of interest rates. International 
imbalances  had  been  mentioned  as  the 
source  of  a  flood  of  liquidity.  Dooley 
acknowledged that they could account for 
low real interest rates and expectations of 
future low rates, resulting in equilibrium 
“high” asset values. However, the crisis 
would require a stop in capital flows, a 
spike in real interest rates and a collapse 
of  the  dollar.  None  of  that  had  been 
observed.  If  easy  monetary  policy  and 
international imbalances were not causes 
of the crisis, they should not determine 
the reaction to the crisis. 
Dooley  argued  that  the  source  of  the 
crisis was a breakdown of the philosophy 
of  supervision.  While  regulation  had 
been improved and new rules imposed, 
the  political  economy  of  supervision 
had not changed. According to Dooley, 
supervision slipped away, because of the 
view  that  the  market  would  supervise 
itself.  No  set  of  regulations  can  deal 
with  this  crisis  unless  they  push  the 
system  far  from  the  efficient  frontier. 
The  proposed  regulatory  reforms  are 
partial descriptions of what any sensible 
and motivated supervisor should do as a 
matter of course. The profit motive will 
continue to drive banks and other financial 
intermediaries to circumvent regulations. 
Dooley concluded, “The problem is that 
ex ante we cannot imagine how they will 
do it or what form of political protections 
and public interest they will invoke to get 
away with it.”
Government bail-outs 
in the euro area: 
Much-needed rescue from 
fiscal collapse or deadly 
threat to long-run stability 
of EMU?
Addressing  the  fiscal  consequences 
of  the  financial  crisis,  José  Manuel 
González-Páramo  (ECB)  called  for 
an effective exit strategy for fiscal policy. 
He  reviewed  fiscal  measures  taken  to 
safeguard the financial system, such as 
the  U.S.  Treasury’s  plan  to  buy  700 
billion US$ of illiquid mortgage-based 
assets, and government interventions in 
the EU to rescue financial institutions 
and stabilize the system. Even though 
the governments intervened, economic 
activity  has  contracted  more  sharply 
than at any time since World War II. 
But the financial crisis would have been 
even  more  intense  and  the  recession 
deeper, if governments had not acted.
The  fiscal  costs  of  the  economic  and 
financial  crisis  are  expected  to  be 
substantial. In the Spring 2009 forecast, 
the  European  Commission  projected 
that government borrowing in the euro 
area would rise to 5.3% of GDP this 
year and 6.5% next year. In addition, 13 
out of 16 euro countries are projected to 
breach the 3% of GDP deficit outlined 
in the Maastricht Treaty. Given the size 
of deficits and the uncertainty regarding 
the final costs of bank rescue packages, 
González-Páramo  emphasized  the 
priority for fiscal policy to set out a clear 
and credible plan for restoring order to 
the  public  finances  over  the  medium 
term. In light also of the fiscal burden 
associated  with  population  ageing,  he 
warned, “if confidence in future stability 
is to be ensured, now is the time to set 
out an effective fiscal exit strategy.”
Referring to the question posed to the 
speakers, Paul De Grauwe (Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven) asked if government 
bailouts  of  financial  institutions  had 
been  necessary  or  dangerous.  In  the 
period prior to the crisis, the problem 
was excessive and fast increasing private 
debt,  instead  of  public  debt.  Yet  the 
euro  zone  had  set  up  an  elaborate 
mechanism  watching  and  controlling 
public  debt  and  deficits.  No  such 
mechanism  existed  to  contain  private 
debt, despite the fact that governments 
were implicitly guaranteeing significant 
parts of private debt, especially debt of 
Michael Dooley 
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financial institutions. Thus, the bailouts 
were  necessary  to  avoid  banking 
collapse, while the deadly threat came 
from  the  explosion  of  private  debt. 
Are the euro area government deficits 
noted by González-Páramo sustainable? 
According to De Grauwe these deficits 
are  not  sustainable  if  maintained  in-
definitely,  and  if  the  nominal  growth 
rate  remains  low.  However,  they  are 
necessary now and will be easier to deal 
with  when  nominal  growth  increases, 
and modern democracies are sufficiently 
mature  to  deal  with  this  problem  by 
adjusting the primary surplus.
As to the ECB’s role during the boom 
years,  De  Grauwe  suggested  its  two-
pillar strategy should have warned about 
excessive  growth  of  bank  credit  and 
liabilities, but did not. While the ECB 
was successful in keeping inflation low, 
its  two-pillar  strategy  failed  to  detect 
the credit boom.
Michael Burda (Humboldt University 
Berlin)reminded the audience that fiscal 
discipline is essential in a monetary union. 
On the national level, governments are 
exposed  to  “too  big  to  fail”  financial 
institutions. At the same time there is 
no  political  will  in  Europe  to  bail out 
governments. A program similar to the 
bailout  of  U.S.  states  to  the  tune  of 
US$  180  billion  is  not  an  option  in 
the  EU.  In  fact,  “an  Italian  or  Greek 
‘California’ would quickly lead to scrip 
issue  and  dissolution  of  the  monetary 
union,” said Burda. ‘Doing nothing’ in 
vulnerable countries such as Italy, would 
be dangerous for they can neither devalue 
nor inflate. 
On the positive side, internal migration 
and  capital  mobility  within  the  euro 
area have increased sharply and provide 
a stabilizing effect. However, a negative 
side effect of EMU is that the low real 
interest  rates  tend  to  lull  governments 
into  complacency.  Real  interest  rates 
could  rise  again,  possibly  sharply  in 
the next three to five years. Exploding 
debt with anemic growth could lead to 
massive speculation against government 
paper from high debt EMU countries. It 
is very important to keep an eye on fiscal 
sustainability  and  maintain  the  euro’s 
credibility. Burda recommended greater 
fiscal  discipline  and  abstaining  from 
admitting new member countries.
As the last speaker of the day, Otmar 
Issing (CFS) drew some lessons from 
the  financial  market  crisis.  Abundant 
liquidity and low interest rates created a 
situation in which excessive risk taking and 
asset price bubbles took place, fostered 
by sophisticated financial innovations. In 
the past, the “Jackson Hole” consensus 
was  that  central  banks  (i)  should  not 
target asset prices, (ii) should not try to 
prick  a  bubble,  and  (iii)  should  follow 
a “mop up strategy” after the burst of a 
bubble injecting enough liquidity to avoid 
a macroeconomic meltdown. Issing said, 
“the big question is whether this should 
be  the  full  story.  Restricting  central 
banks  to  these  three  commandments 
implies a totally asymmetric approach.” 
When asset prices go up monetary policy 
does not react. Yet, when a bubble bursts, 
central banks must come to the rescue. 
Implicitly  or  explicitly  pre-announcing 
this  commitment  as  “savior”  induces 
moral hazard for the actors driving the 
development  of  asset  prices.  Applying 
this approach over a longer period of time 
induces a sequence of ever bigger bubbles 
followed by asset price collapses. 
Issing  emphasized  the  advantage  of 
the  ECB’s  monetary  policy  strategy. 
Its  monetary  analysis  ensures  a  more 
symmetric reaction to bubbles and avoids 
the need to be specific about mispricings 
of assets. It works symmetrically, leaning 
against “headwind” (asset price declines) 
as well as against “tail wind” (increases).
The  biggest  risk  for  central  banks  in 
this  context,  according  to  Issing,  is 
going  outside  their  narrow  mandate 
to  satisfy  political  interest.  There  is  a 
tendency  to  overburden  central  banks 
with  additional  responsibilities.  While 
the  de  Larosière  Group,  of  which  Issing 
was a member, recommended to give the 
ECB responsibility for macro-prudential 
supervision  and  the  leadership  of  the 
European  Systemic  Risk  Council,  it 
argued against giving it responsibility for 
micro-prudential supervision. 
Celia Wieland (CFS & wieland EconConsult)
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The Deutsche Bank Prize 2009 was given to Robert J. Shiller for his contributions 
to financial economics. Shiller is the Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics at the 
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, and Professor of 
Finance at the International Center for Finance, Yale School of Management. He was 
chosen by an international Jury of experts for his path breaking research related to 
the dynamics of asset prices, such as fixed income, equities, and real estate and their 
metrics. His work has been significant not only in the development of theory, but also 
in the implications for practice and policymaking. His contributions to risk sharing, 
financial market volatility, bubbles and crises, have received wide-spread recognition 
among academics, practitioners and policy makers around the globe. 28
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CFS Symposium: 
“Financial Innovation and Economic Crisis”
In honor of Robert J. Shiller
30 September 2009 
Frankfurt am Main
The scientific symposium “Financial Innovation and Economic Crisis” in honor of Robert Shiller aimed 
to encourage discussion on the sources of economic crises, the development of instruments to manage a 
variety of risks and the prevention of future crises. It was organized by Michael Haliassos (CFS and Goethe 
University). Along with a list of prominent speakers, such as Nobel Prize laureate Robert C. Merton of 
Harvard Business School, some 600 participants from politics, academia, press, business and the financial 
sector took part in the event.
Jan  Pieter  Krahnen,  Chairman  of 
the prize Jury, opened the symposium 
by  congratulating  the  winner,  whose 
work “has been highly influential both 
with respect to academic research and 
to its macroeconomic implications.” He 
also  thanked  the  Deutsche  Bank  for 
supporting the prize and in doing so, 
setting a valuable example of corporate 
citizenship. Reviewing the nomination 
process,  he  noted  that  nominators 
from  55  countries  proposed  a  group 
of  more  than  370  nominees,  from 
whom  the  prize  winner  was  selected 
by  an  independent  Jury.  The  Jury 
itself consisted of leading international 
experts  thereby  ensuring  exceptional 
academic standards are maintained and 
enhancing the credibility and reputation 
of the prize.
In his welcome address, Josef Acker-
mann,  Chairman  of  the  Management 
Board and the Group Executive Com-
mittee  of  Deutsche  Bank  AG,  praised 
Robert  Shiller  as  a  noteworthy  prize 
winner.  If  the  financial  world  would 
have spent more time on understanding 
the  dynamics  of  asset  markets,  the 
psychological  underpinnings  of  asset 
bubbles and the risks involved in buying 
a home in Florida versus Arizona in the 
middle  of  the  decade,  then  the  crisis 
would have at least been attenuated.
“An easy way of achieving that task would 
have been to read the contributions of 
Robert Shiller, looking at some of the 
indices he and his colleagues invented,” 
said  Ackermann.  There  would  have 
been greater awareness of the potential 
The Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics is a highly endowed international award given for outstanding 
academic achievements in the fields of money and finance with a practice and policy relevant orientation. It was 
established in 2005 by the Center for Financial Studies, in cooperation with Goethe University Frankfurt. The 
prize is sponsored by the Stiftungsfonds Deutsche Bank im Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft* and 
carries a € 50,000 cash award. It is awarded every two years and presented by Josef Ackermann (Chairman of the 
Management Board and the Group Executive Committee of Deutsche Bank AG). Previous winners were Eugene F. 
Fama (University of Chicago) in 2005 and Michael Woodford (Columbia University) in 2007.
* Deutsche Bank Donation Fund in the Donor‘s Association for German Science
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for  unforeseen  interactions  in  asset 
and  money  markets,  something  most 
existing risk models failed to capture. 
The  costs  of  this  failure  have  been 
immense. A number of large financial 
institutions  failed  and  government 
interventions  were  needed  to  rescue 
others. “Both principled improvements 
based  on  sound  academic  research  as 
well  as  practical  improvements  based 
on  better-grounded  risk  management 
techniques are required,” according to 
Ackermann.
Keynote Lecture: 
On the Science of Finance 
in the Practice of Finance: 
Challenges from the 
Financial Crisis and 
Opportunities from Financial 
Innovation
The  keynote  lecture  was  delivered 
by  Robert  C.  Merton,  Professor  at 
Harvard  Business  School  and  Nobel 
Laureate in Economics. Merton noted 
that  for  nearly  four  decades  financial 
innovation  had  been  a  central  force 
driving  the  global  financial  system 
towards  greater  efficiency  with 
considerable economic benefit accruing 
from  these  changes.  The  scientific 
breakthroughs  in  finance  during  this 
period both shaped and were shaped by 
the extraordinary innovations in finance 
practice  that  expanded  opportunities 
for risk sharing, lowering transactions 
costs  and  reducing  information  and 
agency  costs.  Yet  today,  we  are  in 
a  global  financial  crisis  which  many 
commentators attribute to the changes 
in  the  financial  system  brought  about 
by financial innovation, derivatives and 
mathematical models. Merton’s remarks 
mirrored these seemingly contradictory 
characterizations of finance. 
First,  he  considered  the  structure  of 
credit  risk  propagation  and  explained 
how  large  risks  can  build  up  without 
being  recognized  and  then  appear  to 
explode. In the crisis, guarantees of debt 
in  various  forms  played  an  important 
role.  For  example,  so-called  credit 
default swaps (CDS) are guarantees of 
debt. If a guarantee is used to render a 
risky debt risk-free, then the risky debt 
itself must be equal to the risk-free debt 
minus  the  guarantee.  In  default,  this 
implies that the holder of the guarantee 
receives the difference between what was 
promised and what has been liquidated. 
The value of this guarantee can be very 
sensitive  to  small  movements  in  the 
underlying  asset’s  value.  If  the  asset 
loses value, the value of the guarantee 
goes up and so does the risk involved. 
Thus, in a short time the risk associated 
with a particular portfolio may increase 
a  lot.  Macro  risks  can  then  build  up 
in  a  nonlinear  fashion,  in  particular 
if  the  asset  and  guarantees  change 
hands without full consideration of the 
changes  in  value  and  risk.  Additional 
destructive  feedback  loops  arise  with 
guarantors  writing  a  guarantee  even 
though their assets will not be adequate 
to  meet  obligations  precisely  in  those 
states of the world in which it will be 
called  on  to  pay.  Examples  would  be 
a corporation writing a CDS contract 
on its own debt, or the Pension Benefit 
Corporation  investing  in  the  equities 
of  the  companies  whose  pensions  it 
guarantees.  Indeed,  governments 
act  as  guarantors  of  banks  liabilities, 
for  example  via  deposit  insurance. 
So  “the  governments  are  effectively 
writing  a  guarantee  on  a  guarantee,” 
stressed  Merton.  A  government  can 
be going with very little exposure on 
its guarantees, but should assets fall in 
value as they have, then the risks from 
those assets to the governments can rise 
very dramatically. 
Plenary Lectures
The next speaker, Nicholas Barberis, 
Professor of Finance at the Yale School of 
Management, discussed the relationship 
between “Psychology and the Financial 
Crisis”.  He  quickly  summarized  two 
alternative  widely  expressed  views  on 
the causes of the crisis. One of them is 
the “bad incentives” view, which states 
that  banks  knew  that  subprime  loans 
had a significant risk of default, but their 
incentives led them to keep originating 
and packaging. According to Barberis, 
this explanation only works if decision 
makers have very short-term incentives. 
The other one is the “bad models” view. 
In  this  case,  banks  simply  failed  to 
forecast the likelihood and severity of a 
collapse. Barberis questioned how such 
smart  and  well-trained  people  could 
be  comfortable  with  such  deficient 
models.
Then he proposed a different perspective 
on the crisis based on the concepts used 
in behavioral finance. This explanation 
involves less than fully rational thinking 
by the actors in financial markets and 
institutions.  Though  to  some  level 
banks may have been aware of problems 
associated with their business models, 
a  variety  of  psychological  forces  may 
have driven decision makers to delude 
themselves into thinking that everything 
was  fine.  Reasons  for  such  delusion 
are  found  in  cognitive  dissonance, 
conformity,  groupthink  and  excessive 
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obedience. Cognitive dissonance refers 
to discomfort with beliefs that question 
one’s  self-image.  Thus,  bankers  may 
have manipulated their own beliefs and 
convinced  themselves  that  everything 
was  fine.  Even  if  some  bankers  or 
traders acknowledged the possibility of 
problems to themselves, they may have 
kept quiet for the sake of conformity.
Furthermore, Barberis accentuated the 
role  of  psychological  factors  in  ampli-
fying  the  crisis.  Absence  of  trading 
in  some  debt  markets  may  have  to 
do  with  lack  of  trust  and  ambiguity 
aversion.  Moreover,  the  firm  belief 
that house prices would keep on rising 
may  have  reflected  people’s  tendency 
to see patterns where there are none, 
a behavior called representativeness, or 
their overconfidence. The same psycho-
logical  factors  may  have  led  people 
to  believe  that  they  could  forecast 
future  house  price  movements  more 
accurately than they could, in addition 
to underestimating the risks of taking 
on a large mortgage.
Luis M. Viceira, Professor at Harvard 
Business  School,  spoke  on  “Under-
standing  Inflation-Indexed  Bond 
Markets”. He shared with the audience 
that  he  first  learned  about  inflation-
indexed  bonds  from  Robert  Shiller, 
who  was  studying  them  in  1996  to 
1997  when  the  U.S.  Treasury  was 
thinking about launching these bonds. 
Essentially,  inflation-indexed  bonds 
are bonds whose principal and coupons 
adjust  with  inflation.  In  other  words, 
they preserve the purchasing power of 
the coupon and principal, which is not 
the case for a standard nominal bond. In 
the United Kingdom inflation-indexed 
government bonds were already issued 
in the 1980s, whereas the United States 
followed  in  1997.  In  both  countries, 
these  bonds  are  growing  in  share  of 
total public debt and also as a share of 
GDP. If one thinks about the interest 
rate or yield paid on these bonds, they 
actually reflect market prices or market 
values  unobserved  until  these  bonds 
were invented and issued. This price is 
the real interest rate as assessed by the 
markets. 
Viceira  reviewed  the  decline  of  real 
interest  rates  from  4%  in  the  1980s 
and ‘90s to 2% in the 2000s, leveling 
off  at  around  1%  in  early  2008.  The 
market turmoil in the fall of 2008 sent 
the yield of these bonds up to 3% while 
the yield on their nominal counterparts 
declined massively. However, inflation-
indexed  bonds  gained  in  popularity 
among investors over the years, in spite 
of the short-run volatility they exhibit. 
The  reason  is  that  inflation-indexed 
bonds provide investors with a stream 
of  coupons  and  principal  payment  at 
maturity that is constant in real terms. 
These are not “exotic” or “alternative” 
instruments. “They are a riskless asset 
for long-term investors and should be at 
the very core of conservative portfolios,” 
according to Viceira. Inflation-indexed 
bonds can do what conventional nominal 
government bonds and cash instruments 
cannot. Cash is safe only in the short-
term, if short run inflation uncertainty 
is small, and exposed to reinvestment 
risk  in  the  longer  run,  because  real 
interest  rates  fluctuate.  The  coupon 
and  principal  of  long-term  nominal 
government  bonds  may  be  eroded  by 
unexpected inflation. 
Keynote Lecture: 
Inventors in Finance: 
An Impressionistic History of 
the People Who Have Made 
Risk Management Work
Deutsche Bank Prize winner Robert J. 
Shiller began his speech in German to 
declare how honored he felt to receive 
this prize and thanked Deutsche Bank 
and CFS. He quoted Isaac Newton, “If 
I have seen further, it is by standing on 
the  shoulders  of  giants.”  Shiller  then 
focused  on  the  history  of  innovations 
and  the  giants  who  have  founded  the 
financial system.
According to Shiller, the basic mission of 
finance is risk management and incenti-
vization to further economic growth. In 
order to achieve that, it is necessary to be 
inventive. “What we need is innovation 
and  economic  progress,  not  bailouts,” 
he stressed. Although bailouts might be 
necessary in the short run, they need 
to be done in the context of progress. 
Economic or financial inventions drive 
the economy forward. Yet inventions in 
finance are driven by certain intellectual 
processes. Shiller pointed to behavioral 
economics  and  the  revolution  which 
occurred in the last 30 years in bringing 
psychology into the fields of economics 
Luis Viceira
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and finance. To Shiller, it is essential that 
the knowledge of human psychology is 
incorporated in finance if there is to be 
progress and financial innovation. 
In  response  to  the  financial  crisis, 
Shiller called for a commitment towards 
the democratization of finance making 
it  work  better  for  the  people.  Not 
long  ago,  financial  innovations  were 
used narrowly. Only wealthy or well-
connected people would take advantage 
of  them.  Democratization  of  finance 
implies  setting  up  a  risk  management 
and  incentivization  system  that  works 
well for the society at large. In many 
ways the current financial crisis is due 
to  a  failure  to  manage  certain  kinds 
of  risks.  “We  have  not  democratized 
finance  well  enough  because  we  did 
not put risk management institutions in 
place that could have been there in the 
crisis,” said Shiller. 
The process of invention and advance-
ment of the financial system has to involve 
experimentation  and  many  minds. 
Shiller surveyed historical examples of 
key inventions touching on the founding 
of  the  Dutch  East  India  Company  in 
1602, the Bank of England in 1894, the 
first indexed bond in Massachusetts in 
1780, and the introduction of limited 
liability  in  New  York  State  corporate 
law in 1811. What emerged out of these 
wild ideas, were great innovations. He 
concluded that changes to the financial 
structure  are  needed  but  will  require 
some time to be accomplished. 
Expert Panel: 
Providing perspectives on 
the financial crisis and the 
role of financial innovation 
from different angles
The  symposium  ended  with  a  panel 
discussion,  moderated  by  Michalis 
Haliassos.  Panelists  included  Otmar 
Issing,  President  of  the  Center  for 
Financial  Studies,  Klaus  Schmidt-
Hebbel, Professor at Catholic University 
of Chile, Frank Smets, Director General 
for Research at the ECB, Susan Smith, 
Director  of  the  Institute  of  Advanced 
Study  at  Durham  University  and 
Mistress of Girton College, Cambridge, 
and  Maria  Vassalou,  President  of  the 
European  Finance  Association  and 
Global Macro Portfolio Manager at SAC 
Capital Advisors, LP.
Michael  Haliassos  pointed  to  an 
important challenge brought out by the 
symposium: how to create a new financial 
market environment that fosters socially 
useful financial innovation while at the 
same time avoiding the excesses of the 
past. He cautioned that the answer is 
unlikely to involve a severely constrained 
financial industry unable to experiment 
with new products; or one allowed to 
offer  only  very  simple  products.  He 
introduced the panel as adding to the 
discussion differences in vantage points: 
those of the government and regulators; 
of  the  monetary  policy  maker;  of  the 
international  organization;  of  the 
academic in social sciences; and of the 
professional investor. 
Otmar Issing reminded the audience 
of the surge of criticism of economics 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
He emphasized that financial science is 
in flux, perhaps best illustrated by the 
same  prize  being  given  for  opposing 
views  on  the  efficiency  of  financial 
markets. Turning to the financial crisis, 
Issing  focused  on  an  aspect  that  is 
fundamental to the reform of the system. 
He saw a great risk in that government 
interventions have created the impression 
that  in  the  future  no  major  financial 
institution will be allowed to fail and 
that savers as well as bond holders will 
be largely bailed out. This would be a 
fatal  deviation  from  the  principles  of 
a  free  markets  system  in  which  risk 
and uncertainty are unavoidable. Issing 
advised  stricter  capital  and  liquidity 
restrictions  on  systemically  relevant 
financial  institutions.  Also,  it  should 
Robert Shiller
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be  made  easier  to  resolve  financial 
institutions.  The  required  solution 
combines an unconditional government 
guarantee for the bank’s new business 
after the resolution date with an orderly 
run-down  of  its  business  contracted 
before the resolution. 
Klaus  Schmidt-Hebbel  drew  on 
his  experience  as  former  Director  of 
the OECD Economics Department, to 
discuss  the  crisis  from  the  viewpoint 
of  international  organizations.  He 
acknowledged that just like most other 
observers  they  underestimated  the 
build-up of risks in the world economy 
and  missed  the  problems  in  financial 
regulation and supervision. They should 
have  given  more  weight  to  the  work 
of  Professors  Shiller  and  Case  on  the 
housing  market  and  reacted  to  their 
warnings. Nevertheless, they did identify 
some problems early on, for example, 
the international imbalances implied by 
excess  savings  in  China  and  dissaving 
in the United States. Also, the OECD 
had  questioned  the  role  of  the  semi-
governmental agencies Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in the U.S. housing market. 
International  institutions  responded 
quickly  to  the  crisis.  The  OECD  and 
IMF  advised  governments  and  helped 
induce  cross-country  collaborations, 
analysis and policy recommendations. 
Frank  Smets  addressed  the  pro-
cyclicality  of  the  financial  system  and 
the  various  policy  responses  that  are 
being pursued to alleviate it. Many of 
the booms and busts in credit and asset 
prices  in  the  past  start  from  a  good 
fundamentals  story  underlying  them. 
Yet, time and again there are episodes 
when these good fundamentals mutate 
into  excessive  credit  expansion  and 
risk  taking.  There  are  many  feedback 
mechanisms  that  lead  to  procyclical 
behavior, but fiscal and monetary policies 
also often contribute to it. Initiatives on 
the reform agenda also include measures 
dealing  with  regulation  strengthening 
the  market  infrastructure  and  in-
creasing  transparency.  Furthermore, 
there  is  a  growing  consensus  that  a 
new macro prudential policy framework 
is  needed.  The  European  Council  has 
agreed  to  establish  a  new  framework 
for  both  micro  and  macro  prudential 
supervision.  On  the  macro  side  this 
includes the establishment of a systemic 
risk  board,  which  will  assess  the 
stability of the financial system in the 
EU, issue risk warnings and make policy 
recommendations. 
The effect of innovations in the housing 
economy and interactions with the finan-
cial  crisis  formed  the  focus  of  Susan 
Smith’s  presentation.  She  reviewed 
housing, mortgage and financial markets. 
Their  uneven  integration  is  certainly 
related to the causes of the crisis but 
may also carry seeds of its resolution. 
She looked at equity borrowing in the 
United Kingdom and Australia, finding 
that (i) equity borrowing is widespread, 
frequent  and  not  trivial,  (ii)  housing 
wealth  operates  via  equity  borrowing 
as a store for precautionary savings, and 
(iii) equity borrowing is risky. Finally, 
she  indicated  barriers  to  innovation 
on  the  side  of  industry  and  housing 
demand. 
In conclusion, Maria Vassalou com-
pared  market  efficiency  theory  as 
developed by Eugene Fama, the Deutsche 
Bank  Prize  winner  in  2005,  and  the 
new behavioral finance. She noted that 
market efficiency, that is whether prices 
incorporate  all  available  information, 
can  only  be  tested  along  with  an 
asset  pricing  model.  Thus,  it  is  joint 
hypothesis of market efficiency and the 
particular  model  to  test  it.  Some  of 
the  “bad  press”  that  market  efficiency 
had gotten is related to the particular 
capital  asset  pricing  model  used  in 
testing it. Some of the “anomalies” that 
were studied by behavioral economists 
were  defined  relative  to  mis-specified 
asset  pricing  models.  Instead  of 
signaling  irrationality  of  investors, 
these anomalies are better explained by 
asset pricing models that link important 
macroeconomic variables to asset prices. 
She was skeptical of behavioral finance 
stating  she  “has  seen  no  convincing 
evidence...that markets are persistently 
inefficient and investors act irrationally 
in a way that has a material impact on 
prices for a prolonged period of time.” 
Nevertheless,  she  praised  Shiller  for 
his influential research on asset pricing 
and  on  financial  innovations  such  as 
the  “MacroMarkets”  he  proposed  to 
hedge economic risk factors.   
Celia Wieland (CFS & wieland EconConsult)
Frank Smets
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Executive Education
The Award Ceremony
The symposium was followed by an exclusive award presentation ceremony where 
Josef Ackermann presented the award to Robert Shiller. The laudatio was given 
by Karl Case, the Coman and Barton Hepburn Professor of Economics at Wellesley 
College and co-founder of the widely known Case-Shiller Home Price Index for 
the United States
Karl Case
  Project Manager: Sabine Neumann, Email: db-prize@ifk-cfs.de, www.db-prize-financialeconomics.org
Continuing to expand and improve your professional knowledge is vitally important. However, lack of time 
can be a serious hindrance to attending training courses. For this reason we have developed a new series of 
compact seminars that can be attended after work, right here in Frankfurt. 
New Compact Seminars
The instructors, who are top-class experts in their field, will 
be teaching all the essential aspects of their subject in a four-
hour session, whilst making sure that there is also enough time 
for individual questions and interactive discussions. Without 
doubt, there will be no better way to bring yourself up to date 
on a subject! 
The fee for the Seminars will be € 490.
All our compact seminars will focus on highly topical issues 
and will start at 16:00, finish by 20:00, and be followed by a 
get-together, thus allowing the participants and the instructor 
to continue their discussion in a more informal atmosphere.
All Seminars will be held in German.
 Topics for 2010
  New Compact Seminars:
  •  Behavioral Finance: Anlegeranomalien erkennen 
  •  Bankenfusionen: Potenziale identifizieren 
  •  Fallen und Haftungsrisiken in der Kundenberatung
  •  Spieltheorie: strategisch denken in der Finanzbranche
  •  Projektfinanzierung und Public Private Partnership
  •  Gründung von Finanzdienstleistungsunternehmen
More topics are planned for 2010. If you are interested, please 
contact Christian Rieck (Head of CFS Executive Education)
Email: rieck@ifk-cfs.de
  Regular 2-day Seminars:
  •  Zukunftsseminar 
  •  Kreditderivate 
  •  Zinsprodukte I und II
  •  Behavioral Finance
  More information on the CFS Seminars is available  
  on the CFS website www. ifk-cfs.de under    
  “Executive Education”.
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 News from CFS
We are delighted to announce the appointment of two new CFS Directors. Michael Haliassos and Uwe Walz 
together with Jan Krahnen will form the new CFS management team. Both Haliassos and Walz currently 
hold a chair at the Goethe University and are already associated with CFS. With these appointments we aim 
to reinforce our research activities and to continue our mission in a successful way.
Michael  Haliassos  holds  the 
Chair  in  Macroeconomics  and 
Finance  and  is  Director  of  the 
CFS  Program  on  Household 
Wealth  Management.  Haliassos 
is  also  a  CEPR  Research 
Fellow,  Research  Professor 
at  the  Mannheim  Research 
Institute  on  the  Economics  of 
Aging (MEA), and International 
Research Fellow of NETSPAR. 
He received a B.A. in Economics 
from Cambridge University and a Ph.D. in Economics from 
Yale University. Prior to joining the Goethe University, he 
was a faculty member at the University of Maryland, and at 
the University of Cyprus. He has held visiting appointments 
inter  alia  at  the  European  University  Institute,  and  at  the 
Center of Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF). 
His  research  interests  lie  in  Macroeconomics  and  Finance 
with emphasis on household finance. He has studied household 
portfolio  choice  under  labor  income  risk,  stockholding 
behavior,  consumer  debt,  portfolios  of  aging  households 
internationally,  the  distribution  of  wealth,  the  impact  of 
credit market imperfections, and the role of financial advice.
Haliassos has coordinated a number of international research 
projects, such as a project on “Household Portfolios”, resulting 
in  a  volume  published  by  MIT  Press  that  currently  serves 
as  a  standard  reference  in  household  finance,  and  one  on 
“Stockholding: A European comparison” with results published 
by Palgrave Macmillan Publishers. His papers have appeared in 
international journals, including the International Economic 
Review, the Economic Journal, the Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 
the Review of Finance, and Economic Policy; and in edited 
volumes,  including  the  Handbook  of  Monetary  Economics 
and the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and Finance. 
Haliassos  has  recently  served  as  advisor  to  the  European 
Central Bank on the construction of a major Eurozone Survey 
of Household Finances and Consumption.
Uwe  Walz  holds  the  Chair 
of  Industrial  Organization  at 
the  Goethe  University  and  is 
Program  Director  of  the  CFS 
Program  on  Entrepreneurial 
Finance.  He  is  also  a  research 
pro-fessor  at  the  Centre  for 
European Research (ZEW) and 
an Associate Dean of the Goethe 
Business  School.  He  obtained 
his  doctoral  degree  from  the 
University  of  Tübingen  and 
finished his habilitation at the University of Mannheim. Before 
joining  the  Goethe  University,  he  was  a  visiting  research 
fellow at the London School of Economics and the University 
of California at Berkeley and was associate professor at the 
University of Bochum and the University of Tübingen.
His  research  focuses  on  venture  capital,  private  equity, 
entrepreneurial finance, and contract theory as well as on the 
economics of network industries. Current research projects 
are on the impact of monetary incentive schemes, risk taking 
and leveraged finance in the private equity industry as well 
as on the interrelationship between competition and vertical 
integration in the financial exchange industry. 
Uwe  Walz  has  published  in  various  leading  international 
journals such as the European Economic Review, Economica, 
Journal  of  Urban  Economics,  Journal  of  International 
Economics, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal 
of Public Economics, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal 
of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Business Venturing, 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, and the Review of 
Finance. 
Recently Walz has been actively involved in network research 
on “Risk Capital and the Financing (2003-2008) of European 
Innovative  Firms”  in  the  European  Union  RTN  research 
network RICAFE I and II.
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 News from CFS
Program  Director  Michael  Binder  has  successfully  established  a  new  alliance  between  Goethe  University  Frankfurt, 
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, and Technical University Darmstadt. Together with Isabel Schnabel from the University 
Mainz, he launched the new Graduate School of Economics, Finance, and Management (GSEFM) which offers quantitative and 
research-oriented graduate-level education in economics, finance, and management. More can be found on page 18-19.
The Macro Model Data Base project headed by Program Director Volker Wieland has a new website: 
www.macromodelbase.com. This website contains a model archive that includes many well-known empirically estimated 
macroeconomic models based on a common computational platform. It enables individual researchers to conduct model 
comparisons easily, frequently, at low cost and on a large scale.
The Eurozone Survey on Household Finances and Consumption has now been launched. The Household Finances and 
Consumption Network (HFCN) will collect internationally comparable data on household wealth, assets, and debts in all 
Eurozone countries. CFS Director and Program Director Michael Haliassos, together with Luigi Guiso (EUI) and 
Arthur Kennickell (Federal Reserve Board) served as advisors to the network.
In  September  2009  Program  Director  Erik  Theissen  moved  from  the  University  of  Bonn  to  the 
University of Mannheim. He accepted a position as Professor of Finance at the Department of Business 
Administration.
CFS Director Jan Krahnen is Program Chair of the 37th Annual Meeting of the European Finance 
Association. The event is being organized by the Finance Department of Goethe University and the House 
of Finance. 
The submission deadline is February 15, 2010 (CET).
Submissions can be made via the conference 
website, which may be accessed from a link on the 
Annual Program page at www.efa2010.org.
Keynote Speaker
Douglas W. Diamond 
(University of Chicago
Booth School of Business)
European Finance Association
25-28 August 2010
37th Annual Meeting
Frankfurt am Main
Germany
European Finance Association Call for papers         www.efa2010.org Call for papers         www.efa2010.org Aon  Jauch  &  Hübener  GmbH,  Frankfurt;  Bank  of  Japan,  Frankfurt;  Barclays  Bank  Plc,  Frankfurt;  BDO  Deutsche  Warentreuhand  AG, 
Frankfurt; Berenberg bank, Hamburg; BHF-BANK Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt; Bundesverband deutscher Banken e.V., Berlin; Degussa Bank 
GmbH, Frankfurt; Delbrück Bethmann Maffei AG, Frankfurt; Deutsche Hypothekenbank (Actien-Gesellschaft), Hannover; Deutsche Postbank 
AG, Bonn; Die Sparkasse Bremen AG, Bremen; Dresdner Bank AG, Frankfurt; Ernst & Young AG, Eschborn; Frankfurter Volksbank eG, 
Frankfurt; Franz Haniel & Cie. GmbH, Duisburg; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Frankfurt; Fritz Knapp Verlag, Frankfurt; Goldman Sachs 
International, Frankfurt; Hauck & Aufhäuser Privatbankiers KGaA, Frankfurt; HeidelbergCement AG, Heidelberg; HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt 
AG, Düsseldorf; IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, Frankfurt; infoscore Forderungsmanagement GmbH, Baden-Baden; KfW Bankengruppe, 
Frankfurt; KPMG AG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft, Frankfurt; Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank, Frankfurt; Linde AG, München; Maleki 
Communications GmbH, Frankfurt; Maple Bank GmbH, Frankfurt; McKinsey & Company, Inc., Frankfurt; Mizuho Corporate Bank (Germany) 
AG, Frankfurt; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Frankfurt; PricewaterhouseCoopers AG, Frankfurt; Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. KGaA, Köln; SEB 
AG, Frankfurt; UBS Deutschland AG, Frankfurt; Union Asset Management Holding AG, Frankfurt; Versicherungskammer Bayern, München; 
VICTORIA Versicherung AG, Düsseldorf; Westdeutsche ImmobilienBank, Mainz; WM Gruppe, Frankfurt.
Raimund Bär; Dr. Andreas Bascha; Martin Bloch; Prof. Alexander Dürr; Dr. Bettina Eisenächer; Dr. Robert E. Fiedler; Markus Kopyciok; 
Thomas Krahnen; Dr. Matthias Larisch; Bernd Mack; Andre P.H. Müller; Dr. Frederik Pajunk; Karsten Rixecker; Dr. Christian Schiller; 
Dr. Michael Schüllermann; Thomas Seidel; Prof. Dr. Uwe Vielmeyer; Dietmar Vogelsang; Dr. Markus Warncke; Martin Wilhelm; Dr. Peter 
Wilke; Dr. Jens Zinke.
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